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A FRAMEWORK FOR THE ANALYSIS OF THE
RESERVE OFFICER AUGMENTATION PROCESS
IN THE UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

by

Curtis John Powell

December 1987

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**A Framework for the Analysis of the Reserve Officer
Augmentation Process in the United States Marine Corps**

by

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Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.S., St. John Fisher College, 1980**

**Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of**

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This study examines the major components and issues involved in the Reserve officer augmentation process in the United States Marine Corps. A complete description of the legal background, quota determination process and selection method is presented. In addition, a framework for analysis of the augmentation process is outlined as a guide to future research. An analysis using the 1985/1986 Officer Exit Surveys, demographic data, and fitness report performance was done to study the differences between Regular and Reserve officers. This analysis attempted to assess the type of officer the Marine Corps is losing and how augmentation plays a role in this attrition. The results were inconclusive as to performance differences between the two groups, however, Reserve and Regular officers had marked differences in their reasons for leaving the Marine Corps. This study does not conclude whether or not augmentation is a problem, but rather provides a logical, objective research methodology in which to undertake analysis of the issue.



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I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The problem of retention, especially officer retention, has plagued the military for some time. The All-Volunteer Force (AVF) has brought military manpower planning to the forefront of manpower research. The issues of retention and recruitment planning to meet Congressionally-mandated authorizations have sparked a great deal of manpower supply analysis. Frequently overlooked, however, is the military's management of the existing manpower stock. Many studies have analyzed the causes and effects of the attrition of military members, but few, if any, have evaluated the manpower management policies of the services and their impact on attrition. Quite often a service's manpower policies will have the most significant impact on the perceptions and intentions of its personnel. The focus of this thesis is to develop a framework for analyzing an important officer manpower planning issue - the augmentation process in the United States Marine Corps.

Marine Corps officers are accessed primarily from Officer Candidate School (OCS), Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC), U. S. Naval Academy, and the Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) programs. The historical breakdown is shown in Table 1.

TABLE 1
MARINE CORPS OFFICER ACCESSIONS, BY SOURCE

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>% OF NEW ACCESSIONS</u>
Officer Candidate Class (OCC)	10.0
Platoon Leaders Class (PLC)	44.4
Warrant Officers	10.8
Naval Academy	9.4
NROTC	16.7
Enlisted Commission Program/ Marine Enlisted Scientific Education Program (ECP/MCSEP)	6.9
Women Officer Candidate Class (WOC)	<u>1.8</u>
	100.0
[Ref. 1]	

Only those officers accessed from the Naval Academy and the NROTC Scholarship program (95% of all NROTC officers) automatically receive Regular commissions. The remainder are commissioned as officers in the Marine Corps Reserve and assigned to active duty for usually a 3 1/2 year period.

A Regular officer is a person who holds a permanent appointment in a commissioned grade above Chief Warrant Officer-4 (CWO-4) in the Regular Marine Corps. A Reserve officer is one who holds a permanent appointment in a commissioned grade above CWO-4 in the Marine Corps Reserve. Such an officer may be on active duty or in the Ready Reserve and not on active duty. [Ref. 2:p. 15]

The major difference between the two types of commissions (officers), for purposes of this thesis, is career opportunity. Career opportunity is defined as the probability that an officer will be able to make the Marine

Corps a career, if he chooses to do so. The Regular commission has an indefinite expiration date, and as such, these officers serve at the pleasure of the President of The United States. As long as these officers are promoted, they may stay in the Marine Corps, on active duty, for essentially as long as they desire. By contrast, Reserve officers are usually obligated for 3 1/2 years. During this initial period of active duty, these officers must apply for appointment into the Regular Marine Corps, or request extended active duty (EAD), if they desire to stay on active duty (augmentation). If unsuccessful, these officers are released from active duty. The issue is that Reserve officers must not only be promoted to remain on active duty, but they must also clear the substantial hurdle of augmentation. The augmentation step creates the difference in career opportunity between Regular and Reserve officers.

Augmentation is the process by which a Reserve officer in the grades of Second Lieutenant through Colonel is appointed in the Regular Marine Corps. [Ref. 2:p. 15] Augmentation is a controversial and pertinent topic for many reasons, some of which are listed below:

1. The majority (67 percent) of new officer accessions each year hold Reserve commissions. Therefore, augmentation impacts most junior Marine officers.
2. The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) strongly intends an all-Regular career officer force by the 11th year of commissioned service. This imposes a legal career constraint on Reserve officers.

3. Reserve officers perceive an inequality in career opportunities because those officers who are awarded Regular commissions initially (Naval Academy, NROTC Scholarships) do not have to compete for augmentation.
4. A key question arises - "Are we keeping the best officers?" This doubt surfaces primarily from the career opportunity differences between Regular and Reserve officers. Some Regular officers can remain on active duty for up to 12 years (until the Major's promotion board) as marginal performers while Reserve officers have the unique screening of augmentation to "weed out" the weaker officers. The Marine Corps needs an answer to this quality question.

The Marine Corps needs to analyze the costs and benefits of augmentation policy. Is it wise to release a Reserve officer from active duty without possibly recouping substantial training costs?

A sound, analytical study of the augmentation process can help eliminate many misconceptions about the process and ensure that the policy is effective in shaping a high quality career officer force in consonance with Congressionally-mandated limits.

B. OBJECTIVES

To date, a comprehensive study of the augmentation process and its manpower implications has not been done. Many fragmented areas have been analyzed, but a policy with as many positive and negative spillover effects must be studied as a total manpower program. This thesis will attempt to provide others with a framework for a comprehensive study of the augmentation process which can be used to refine augmentation policy based upon a more objective analysis.

C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The primary research question of this thesis is: "What are the principal components of the augmentation process and how can they be analyzed in order to evaluate Marine Corps officer augmentation policy?"

A secondary research question is: "Through Analysis of 1985/86 Officer Exit Surveys and matching performance data, can inferences be drawn about the attitudes and quality of Reserve and Regular officers the Marine Corps is losing?" Specifically, are the Reserve officers who failed augmentation notably different from the Regular officers who left the Marine Corps voluntarily?

D. SCOPE

The areas specifically addressed in this thesis will be as follows: (1) the legal authority, guidelines, and impact of DOPMA; (2) augmentation quota determination and promotion flow points; (3) the Officer Retention (augmentation) Board (ORB) composition and methodology; (4) a statistical presentation of the ORB results for 1983-87; (5) the framework needed to conduct a comprehensive analysis of this issue; and (6) an analysis of the 1985/86 Officer Exit Surveys and performance data on Reserve officers who failed augmentation and Regular officers who left voluntarily. This thesis will be primarily a research and management

guide. Limitations on the thesis are the lack of ORB results prior to 1983 and the paucity of previous research on augmentation.

The assumptions of this thesis are: (1) the 1985/86 Officer Exit Surveys are reflective of the attitudes of the majority of departing officers; (2) 1985 and 1986 were typical years of officer attrition; and (3) no radical changes to force size are likely.

E. DEFINITIONS

Active Comissioned Service. Service on active duty as a commissioned officer or commissioned warrant officer.

Active Duty. Full-time duty in the active military service of the United States. It includes duty on the active-duty list; active military service to pursue special work; active military service in preparing and administering policies and regulations, organizing, recruiting, instructing, and training which affect the Reserve component; full-time training duty; annual training duty, and attendance, while in the active military service, at a school designated as a service school by law or by the Secretary of the Navy.

Active-Duty List. A list of all officers on active duty in the Marine Corps, except those officers described in sections 265, 672(d), 678, and 641 of Title 10 U.S. Code (e.g., Reserve officers on active duty for training, Full-Time Support, etc).

Applicant. An officer who applies, or who is considered without making formal application, for transfer.

Augmentation. The appointment of a Reserve officer in the Regular Marine Corps under sections 531-533 of Title 10 U.S. Code or the appointment of a Reserve warrant officer in the Regular Marine Corps under sections 555 and 602 of Title 10 U.S. Code. Also referred to as "augmentation."

Extended Active Duty (EAD). Active duty which is performed by a Reserve officer on the active-duty list for a specified period beyond the officer's initial active duty obligation or obligated service.

Officer Retention Board (ORB).

- (1) A board of commissioned officers of the Regular Marine Corps appointed by the Secretary of the Navy for the purpose of recommending Reserve officers and Reserve warrant officers for transfer to the Regular Marine Corps, and limited duty officers for redesignation as unrestricted officers.
- (2) The ORB may also be appointed by the CMC to serve as the Directed Lateral Move Board, to choose officers selected for augmentation to lateral move from military occupational specialties (MOS's) over in the Regular officer requirement into MOS's critically short (less than 85 percent) of the requirement.

Ready Reserve. The Selected Marine Corps Reserve (SMCR) and Individual Ready Reserve (IRR) constitute the Ready Reserve.

Regular Officer. An officer of the Regular Marine Corps on the active-duty list serving under a permanent appointment in a grade above chief warrant officer, W-4.

Standard Written Agreement (SWAG). A contract executed under section 679 of Title 10 U.S. Code between a Reserve officer or a Reserve warrant officer, not on the active-duty list, and the Secretary of the Navy or his representative for that officer to serve an additional period of active duty of 1 to 5 years.

Unrestricted Officer. An officer in the grade of second lieutenant or above not designated for limited duty.

[Ref. 2:p. 15]

F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

Chapter II presents a review of current literature written about augmentation and the legislative history of current laws affecting officer management, specifically DOPMA.

Chapter III contains a complete description of the augmentation process, quotas, methodology and past ORB results.

Chapter IV establishes the framework for analysis and relevant questions to be studied.

Chapter V presents the analysis and results of the 1985/86 Officer Exit Survey data. Comparisons of attitudes and performance between Regular and Reserve officers are presented.

Chapter VI contains the conclusions and recommendations resulting from the analysis.

II. LITERATURE REVIEW

The most important reference for any discussion of augmentation is the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980. This legislation provides the impetus for officer career management and specifically addresses Reserve officer career administration. The Act has significantly contributed to the augmentation controversy.

DOPMA has many purposes, three of which are germane to this thesis. The Act:

1. Establishes new statutory limitations on the number of field grade officers who may serve in senior grades below Flag and General officer rank;
2. Provides common law for the appointment of Regular officers and for the active-duty service of Reserve officers;
3. Establishes common provisions governing career expectation in the various grades. [Ref. 3:p. 3]

To fully understand the impact of DOPMA, it is necessary to review some of the background of officer personnel legislation.

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was a response to the problem of having an unready officer corps each time hostilities broke out. [Ref. 3:p. 8] This was true up to and including World War II. Additionally, the problem of an officer corps having the improper experience and maturity at each command level persisted. There was no established mechanism to remove those unfit or unready for command.

[Ref. 3:p. 8] The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 created the "up or out" promotion system. This system provided that officers should move through the various ranks in cohort groups (year groups), and considerations for promotion at different points in their careers were established in the Act. The Act provided that officers twice passed over for promotion would be separated from active service or retired within a certain number of years after selection failure, depending on grade. [Ref. 3:p. 9]

Before World War II, most officers served 30 or more years before retirement. The Officer and Personnel Act established specific total years of service an officer could serve if failing promotion. These constraints are illustrated in Table 2.

TABLE 2
TOTAL TIME IN SERVICE LIMITATIONS FOR OFFICERS
FAILING PROMOTION UNDER THE OFFICER
PERSONNEL ACT OF 1947

<u>GRADE</u>	<u>MANDATORY SEPARATION/RETIREMENT (YEARS)</u>
Colonel	30
Lt. Colonel	28
Major	21
Captain (Army and Air Force)	14
First Lieutenant (Army and Air Force)	7

Navy Lieutenants and Lieutenants (junior grade) were required to be separated following their second failure of selection. [Ref. 3:p. 9]

Thus the Act attempted to provide an appropriate distribution of officers of proper maturity and experience in the various grades - this is commonly referred to as grade distribution.

The Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was not without its shortcomings. Most of these were related to assumptions which did not materialize. First, the Act was based on an assumption that the Armed Forces would return to a small, all-Regular force within ten years. [Ref. 3:p. 10] The lawmakers did not foresee the large, standing force of the future. Secondly, the law imposed statutory ceilings on the number of Regular officers in each service. However, in providing for the transition, it also gave the Secretary of each branch authority for temporary promotions when the number of Regular and Reserve officers on active duty was more than the statutory ceiling of Regular officers. Later, this second provision of the law will become an issue.

A summary of the intent of the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 is provided by the House Armed Services Committee Report on the Act. It stated:

The Committee takes the position that it is bringing before the House an equitable, economical, and forward-looking officer promotion program for the services - a program that will offer careers satisfactory enough to attract capable men, promising enough to hold in service the capable men already in uniform, and economical enough to be acceptable from a budgetary standpoint. [Ref. 4]

While intent of the Act was excellent and its provisions ground-breaking, many unforeseen events caused lawmakers to legislate readjustments to it.

The Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954 was Congress' response to concerns about the increased numbers of senior officers and the increased use of temporary promotions. The Act was passed with the intent to better control the grade distribution. [Ref. 3:p. 10] This law established specific limitations on the numbers of both Regular and Reserve officers that could serve on active duty in the grades of O-4 and above. Congress undertook this action in the belief that the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 was too liberal in its provisions regarding temporary grade structure, especially in the Navy and Marine Corps. However, Congress did recognize that officer personnel management could not be subject to sudden and unforeseen fluctuations as through short-term legislation and appropriations riders. [Ref. 3:p. 10] Congress wanted the services to be able to conduct long-range management of the officer force.

Congress has also passed legislation to meet special problems. For example, in 1959 Congress passed "hump" legislation to allow additional forced attrition for Navy and Marine Corps officers in the grade of O-5 and O-6. This provided "selection out" of the overages in the senior grades. [Ref. 3:p. 11]

The most significant development over the years between the previously discussed legislation and DOPMA is the anomaly of the career active-duty Reservist. This is the

crucial circumstance leading to DOPMA and its important impact on augmentation.

Prior to DOPMA, the law generated the anomaly of large numbers of Reserve officers who served 20 years and qualified for active duty retirement. However, the law also provided for different handling of Reserve and Regular officers which was often perceived as inequitable by Reserve officers. [Ref. 3:p. 12]

The Reservist on active duty under this law was faced with uncertain career expectation. There was no provision for minimum time in grade prior to retirement or separation, and the reservist could be released at any time based on the needs of the service.

Reductions in force, especially when the services are decreasing their strength following a war, cause commensurate numbers of officers in various grades to be released. It is important to note that these reductions fell heavily upon Reserve officers. [Ref. 3:p. 12] The grades of O-4 to O-6 were especially sensitive to this since Regular officers upon attaining permanent O-4 grade have a career expectation of 20 years of service. Upon completion of 20 years of service he is eligible for immediate retirement.

Reserve officers had no such career expectation and in times of reductions in force, could be released with anywhere from 10 to 18 years of service, short of qualifying for immediate retirement.

There were two distinct advantages to being a Reserve officer at this time. First, a Reservist who completed 20 years active duty could receive full military retirement pay and the full Federal civil service pay, if so employed. This advantage was not extended to Regular officers who retired, since the compensation law limiting the combined income was written for Regular officers. Secondly, the law allowed Army and Air Force officers dual consideration in promotion boards. The officer could be considered by both the active duty and reserve promotion boards. This caused the situation where a Reserve officer could retire at a grade higher than ever reached on active duty. [Ref 3:p. 13] DOPMA, as will be discussed later, corrected these predicaments by establishing an all-Regular career force.

A. MAJOR PROVISIONS OF DOPMA

1. Grade Table

DOPMA established authorization ceilings on the number of officers in the grades O-4 to O-6. This allowance for "field grades" is expressed in the law as a finite number of officers in relation to the entire officer corps of each service. This is known as the grade table, replacing the fixed percentage limits for Regular officers in the Officer Personnel Act of 1947 and the grade limits for temporary promotions of the Officer Grade Limitation Act of 1954. The grade table is intended to help the services keep the proper mix of age and experience, provide

attractive career opportunities, and establish somewhat consistent career opportunities among the services. [Ref. 3:p. 14]

Table 3 provides the grade table for the Marine Corps. Mathematical interpolation is used to compute authorized strengths when the total number of commissioned officers is in between steps (ex. if total number of officers was 21,000).

TABLE 3
AUTHORIZED STRENGTHS OF COMMISSIONED MARINE OFFICERS
ON ACTIVE DUTY IN GRADES O-4 TO O-6 UNDER DOPMA

Total Number of <u>Commissioned Officers</u>	<u>Major</u>	<u>Lieutenant Colonel</u>	<u>Colonel</u>
12,500	2,499	1,388	592
15,000	2,717	1,483	613
17,500	2,936	1,579	633
20,000	3,154	1,674	654
22,500	3,373	1,770	675
25,000	3,591	1,865	695

[Ref. 5:p. 73]

There are three major interacting variables balanced to achieve proper career mix:

- (1) The Grade Distribution - the numbers of officers in each grade. (see Table 3 above)
- (2) The Promotion Point - the years of service where the greatest number are promoted.
- (3) The Promotion Opportunity - cumulative opportunity for advancement.

Table 4 contains promotion flow points and promotion opportunity set forth in the House Report accompanying DOPMA. [Ref. 3]

TABLE 4
PROMOTION FLOW POINTS (YRS AT PROMOTION)
AND PROMOTION OPPORTUNITY INTENDED BY CONGRESS

<u>To The Grade Of</u>	<u>Yrs at Promotion</u>	<u>% Opportunity</u>
Colonel	22 \pm 1	50
Lt. Colonel	16 \pm 1	70
Major	10 \pm 1	80

[Ref. 3: p. 18]

In addition, other variables such as retirements, resignations, deaths and forced attrition all affect career patterns.

It is important to note that these variables are the key players in augmentation policy decisions. Congress realized the delicate balance of these variables and suggested that any changes in the structure of the officer corps be made carefully and with consideration of promotion opportunity. [Ref. 3:p. 14]

DOPMA, like the Officer Grade Limitation Act did not impose limits on grades O-1 through O-3. Both Acts recognized that expansion and contraction of the officer force to meet requirements impacts heavily on the junior officer grades.

The grade tables for field grade officers were designed based on the actual retention of officers around 1978-1980. [Ref 3: p. 16] The House Committee that wrote the report to accompany the Act recognized that current retention was lower than desirable at that time. The Act allowed promotion "windows", that is, a time frame for

promotion rather than a specific year. For example, promotion to O-5 should occur between the 15th and 17th year of service.

A key perception of the grade tables is provided by the following:

Recognizing that the grade tables are based on retention that is considerably lower than that required to reach requirements as computed under current methodology in the mid- to long-term, the Committee would be receptive to legislation in the next 3 to 5 years that, in the face of improving retention and more definitive grade requirement determinations, would increase the statutory ceilings to continue to permit operation within DOPMA management parameters (promotion opportunity and timing).
[Ref. 3:p. 16]

This statement of future responsiveness to changing needs will be utilized later by the Marine Corps to propose an increase in its allowance of O-4's in order to enhance augmentation opportunities.

2. Up-or-Out System is Retained

Lawmakers were pleased with the change in the officer corps brought about by the "up-or-out" system. The "up-or-out" system means that an officer must be promoted in order to remain on active duty. DOPMA also made all promotions permanent. Congress felt that this system has given the Armed Forces a youthful, vigorous, and fully-combat-ready officer corps. These objectives also apply indirectly to augmentation opportunity. Lawmakers designed the up-or-out system fully knowing that it would result in passover for promotion of officers who were totally qualified to serve in the next higher grade. The function

of the up-or-out system is to provide at each rank more qualified officers than there are vacancies to fill. This allows the services to pick the best of those qualified. Congress wanted a competitive system where the most outstanding are selected when the system is working correctly. [Ref. 3:p. 19] One could argue that the corollary of this concept is to pick the best Reserve officers for augmentation into the Regular Marine Corps. It would not be desirable to have more billets or a greater number of augmentation quotas than there are qualified officers.

3. Active-Duty List

DOPMA provided for a single active duty list in each service. This list contains the names of all O-1's and above on active duty except for retired officers and certain Reserve officers specifically excluded from the grade table. [Ref. 3:p. 24] The active duty list is used to establish seniority within grade, to determine eligibility for promotion, and to provide for proper timing of the promotion system. It is also used for determining promotion zones, relative promotion opportunity and for the legal determination of failure of selection. [Ref. 3:p. 24]

4. All-Regular Career Force

DOPMA intended to have the services achieve an All-Regular officer force generally by the 11th year of service, while still allowing the Secretary of the individual

services flexibility on the specific point based on the service's force structure. [Ref. 3: p. 24] This early-integration of all Reserve officers into the career force ended the anomaly of the career Reserve officer and his vulnerability to forced attrition. The Marine Corps is allowed 16,000 Regular officers, O-1 and above. [Ref. 3:p. 14]

Congress intended that selection into the Regular force should occur mostly by the 9th year of service, with the 11th year representing only the last of many opportunities. Individual services are allowed to achieve this Reserve integration earlier. However, if the services chose to have an all-Regular force from the first year of commissioned service, the effect would be detrimental. Promotion to O-3 would be difficult and outside of normal promotion windows (4-6 YCS). A balance of Reserve and Regular is beneficial. The Act also suggested that if augmentation opportunities are presented at the 9th through 11th year of service, then they should be coordinated with the selection board for promotion to O-4. [Ref. 3:p. 25]

It is this provision of DOPMA which has the greatest effect on augmentation. The legal constraint of an all-Regular force compels the services to select the best of the qualified Reserve officers for retention.

5. Separation Pay

Congress did not desire that the All-Regular career force and continuation procedure provisions go into effect without providing some kind of a "safety net". The separation pay is a contingency payment for a career-committed officer to whom a full military career may be denied. [Ref. 3:p. 30] This pay is designed to encourage an officer to pursue a military career, while allowing for adequate readjustment pay if he is denied this opportunity under the competitive system. Separation pay is intended to ease the transition back into civilian life. Previous laws allowed 2 months basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of \$15,000. Officers with 5 or more years of service received the maximum. DOPMA revised separation pay to 10 percent of annual basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of \$30,000. [Ref. 3:p. 31]

This change in separation pay had the effect of making it even more costly to wait past the 5 year point to select officers for augmentation. Separation pay has a significant influence on an officer's career intentions. It is sometimes the deciding factor on whether to stay in or not, or how actively they pursue augmentation.

6. Continuation and Tenure

Both continuation and tenure are important to officer retention and since retention affects augmentation quotas, a discussion of DOPMA changes is warranted.

The most significant continuation provision of DOPMA is regarding the rank of O-4. Majors may be discharged after the second failure for promotion, but it was the strong desire of Congress that Majors be continued to completion of 20 years of service unless in unusual circumstances. [Ref. 6:p. 20] The retention rate of Majors, as will be discussed later in Chapter III, is an important determinant of augmentation quotas.

In summary, DOPMA has provided the services with the most comprehensive officer management plan to date. The key provisions of establishing grade tables, retention of the up-or-out system, creating the active-duty list, instituting the All-Regular career force, increasing separation pay, and the changes to continuation and tenure make DOPMA the foundation of augmentation policy.

B. OTHER RELEVANT LITERATURE

The remaining literature on augmentation is primarily of a commentary nature. Since no analysis of this topic has been published, these commentary articles give insight into the problems and perceptions of the Marine Corps augmentation system.

Hammes [Ref. 7] discusses a few of the problems of augmentation and Regular and Reserve junior officer career opportunity differences. He suggests that all Marine Officers should receive Reserve commissions, regardless of source (i.e., OCS, Naval Academy, etc.), and all should then

compete for augmentation. Hammes states that NROTC Scholarships and Naval Academy graduates are given preferential treatment by receiving Regular commissions automatically. The author says this severely restricts augmentation opportunities because the Regular-commissioned officers fill 70 percent of the total Regular slots available. He also states that these officers who receive automatic Regular commissions solely due to accession source, are untested as Marine Officers and should not be awarded this career opportunity until evaluated either in Officer Candidate School (OCS) or with an active unit in the Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Hammes raises the omni-present augmentation issue of marginal Regular officers displacing proven Reserve high performers by taking up a large percentage of Regular slots. This is a fairly prevalent attitude among junior Reserve officers.

Hammes proposes that, in addition to initially giving all officers Reserve commissions, the additional obligated service requirement of NROTC and Naval Academy graduates be kept. He argues that this will provide time to recoup the investment in accession costs and provide these officers with more opportunities to augment.

The author points out another subtle inequity between Regular and Reserve junior officers. The active duty list (or commonly referred to as the "lineal list") is the basis for promotion zones and therefore "seniority" in each of the

services. How an officer is initially ranked on this list can have a long-term career impact. Hammes points out that Regular officers (NROTC and Naval Academy graduates) upon initial accession are placed on the lineal list based on their academic standing in college. However, Reserve officers are placed on the list based on class standing at The Basic School (TBS). This system penalizes the people who do well at their first true Marine Corps challenge, TBS. His suggestion that the Marine Corps rate each officer on the lineal list with a combination of Officer Candidate School (OCS) and TBS standing is sound. In fact, the system was changed in 1983 to permit initial placement on the active-duty list by class standing in TBS. However, Regular officers, as a group, are placed above Reserve officers.

Armstrong [Ref. 8] raises the same issue as Hammes regarding the lack of augmentation spaces due to those officers initially commissioned as Regular officers. He contends that we are keeping the best of our Reserve officers, but what about the Regular officers? Are they the equally or less qualified than the Reserve officers we release due to failure to augment?

The author reveals that Hammes' suggestion of commissioning Naval Academy and NROTC midshipmen as Reserve officers can become reality. He cites Title 10 U.S. Code as stating Naval Academy and NROTC Scholarship may be appointed Regular officers, not must be. Tradition and policy - not

law - dictate that Naval Academy and NROTC midshipmen join the officer ranks with Regular commissions. [Ref. 8:p. 31]

Major Armstrong contends that while NROTC and the Academy demand excellence of their members, these programs do not equal FMF-tested experience. This is just one more reason to cut back on Regular commissions to graduates of these two programs. He does not, however, advocate the elimination of all Regular commissions, since "lean" retention times will come again and it helps to have a solid source of Regular officers. This is an important point. Regular officer input provides a stable manpower base for the Corps, and a source of highly educated and intelligent officers.

Nevertheless, Armstrong suggests that the awarding of Regular commissions be firmly tied to performance as a Marine. He proposes that a small percentage of Regular appointments be given to every commission source (OCS, PLC, included) based on OCS performance, not on a scholarship won as a high school senior. [Ref. 8:p. 30] Thereafter, Regular appointments should be made available at every level of career development such as TBS, follow-on specialty schools, etc., all based on superior performance. Additionally, he recommends quotas be given to squadron and battalion commanders to meritoriously augment some of their outstanding junior officers. This is a dangerous precept. Comparisons of quality should be made grade-wide, year-group

wide, etc., but not unit-wide. There is great potential for abuse in this suggestion. Armstrong does recommend retaining the Officer Retention Board (ORB), but he is unclear as to how the inequity of selection between a battalion augmentation board and a Corps-wide ORB would be handled.

In summary, Armstrong's Article proposes that all officers get an equal start and that augmentation opportunities be more widely available. He advocates linking augmentation to successful performance as a Marine. His proposed changes would improve the officer corps and allow "late-bloomers" time to grow.

Colonel Murphy [Ref. 9] provides a useful critique of both Major Armstrong's and Captain Hammes' articles. Murphy asserts that Regular commissions should continue to be given to NROTC and Academy graduates. While not giving specifics, he says that statistically, officers from these sources have the best success rates in more demanding career courses, such as flight school or artillery training. [Ref. 9:p. 35] It would be interesting to see the data supporting this conclusion or, if unavailable, undertake a study to analyze the effect of commission source on school performance.

The author further states that NROTC and the Academy are adequate screening programs and to reach this point of selection required them to clear some substantial hurdles that mark them as some of the top high school

graduates/leaders in the nation. [Ref. 9: p. 35] He makes the excellent point that these talented potential officers will look elsewhere if there are not reasonable guarantees for a career as a Regular officer. While OCS and PLC graduates may be talented and come from outstanding universities, Murphy concludes that they have not had the lengthy screening, training or commitment of the other officers. [Ref. 9:p. 35] In short, the Corps should not penalize Academy or NROTC graduates because certain officers are finding it difficult to augment in a given year.

A strong point of Murphy's article is that he discredits using OCS and TBS performance as the only basis for lineal list ranking and augmentation. He foresees those officers whose appearance, size and ability to "grunt" the loudest will get an advantage over the more "erudite" officers. OCS and TBS alone are not foolproof screening methods. In summary, Colonel Murphy asserts that we cannot divest ourselves of proven Regular commissioning programs simply in order to accommodate every dedicated officer.

Holland [Ref. 9] delineates the Marine Corps specific knowledge that the Naval Academy provides to future Marine Corps officer. First of all, Holland counters Hammes' point that OCS is the "real test" of a candidate's mettle by calling attention to "Plebe summer" at the Academy. He says that requiring all Academy graduates to endure OCS, inappropriately discounts the challenges of Plebe summer and the rigors of military life at the Academy.

The author further states that the Academy provides many more opportunities for observed leadership positions than do both OCS and TBS combined. Holland argues that Hammes dismissed the amount of leadership experience at the Academy due to a lack of information.

Holland counters Hammes' assertion that somehow Academy graduates are less informed on the Marine Corps. He states the Marine Corps history is regularly covered in the curriculum and that those midshipmen who "service select" as Marines receive bi-weekly classes and lectures by Marine officers at the Academy. Furthermore, Holland says that most of the classes given at TBS are a review of similar classes given to Academy midshipmen.

Holland sums up by concluding that the mixture of OCS and Academy graduates is good for the Marine Corps. He says the issue of a Regular commission is controversial, but that one should not use the "flawed" reasoning of Captain Hammes to settle it.

In summary, one can easily see that augmentation is a sensitive issue, which divides the officer corps in opinion. DOPMA has presented us with the tools for reform, designed mostly to help solve the Reserve officer vulnerability issue. Articles have been written on various policy alternatives to increase augmentation quotas. However, it is important to note that during the time period these articles were written, augmentation opportunity had hit an

all-time low of 21.5 percent. (see Table 8) What is most evident in this review of relevant literature is that no real analytical study has been applied to help answer some of the questions like "Are we keeping the best?" While statistical analysis is not the answer to the entire problem, it can help diffuse some of the opinion-charged alternatives that are currently being offered. The augmentation issue requires orderly, systematic and repeated analyses. To aid in this effort, this thesis will develop the framework in which such analyses should proceed.

In the next chapter, the augmentation process will be defined along with results of recent ORBs. This will provide the reader with knowledge of the system and provide the framework target areas to be used in Chapter IV.

III. THE MARINE CORPS AUGMENTATION PROCESS

A. THE CONCEPT

DOPMA tasks each service to achieve an all-Regular officer force generally by the 11th year of service. This means that as each year group (officers commissioned between 1 July and the following 30 June) matures to its 11th year of commissioned service (YCS), the population of that year group (YG) should consist of all Regular officers. [Ref. 10:p. 27] The Act further restricts the total Regular Marine officer population to 16,000, excluding Warrant and General officers. [Ref. 11:p. 73] Congress has authorized an end strength of approximately 20,000 Marine officers, both restricted and unrestricted officers on active duty. What this means is that some 5,000 Reserve officers (after subtracting Limited Duty officers) are required to meet the needs of the Marine Corps. Each year the Marine Corps accesses approximately 1,000 Reserve and 500 Regular officers.

The Regular officer cap of 16,000 is based on Congressional intent for promotion time (10 YCS + 1 to Major) and promotion opportunity (80 percent for Major). [Ref. 11:p. 73] A Regular officer force above this level would either force promotion opportunity down due to grade table limits or drive the promotion timing window past the

9-11 years of service guideline. Since the focus of the Congressional guidelines is Regular officers, it is what happens to this population which has the greatest effect on augmentation. The number of augmentation vacancies is dependent, in large part, upon the attrition of officers from the Regular force.

The Marine Corps further breaks down the officer population into categories. There are five categories of officers based on military occupational speciality (MOS). They are:

- (1) Ground officers (GRND)
- (2) Helicopter pilots (HELO)
- (3) Fixed-Wing pilots (FW)
- (4) Judge Advocate General officers (JA)
- (5) Naval Flight Officers (NFO)

These categories, integrated with an officer's appropriate year group, establish the Year Group management system used by the Marine Corps. The size of a category within a year group is a function of the requirement for that category. Augmentation vacancies for the Officer Retention Board (ORB) are established by comparing the optimum Regular officer requirement for each year group category (ex. Ground 1980) with its actual Regular officer inventory. The actual computational method will be discussed later in this chapter.

In summary, the four main factors which drive the augmentation process are:

- (1) the intent to have an All-Regular career force by the 11th year of commissioned service,
- (2) the limit on active duty field grade officers,
- (3) Congressional guidelines for promotion opportunity and timing, (which has the greatest influence), and
- (4) projected Regular officer continuation rates.

Since the size of each year group is a function of these factors, the number of augmentation spaces is sensitive to any changes in these factors.

B. METHODS OF AUGMENTATION

The Marine Corps administers three basic programs for augmentation.

(A) The Basic School Augmentation Program

The Basic School (TBS) is the initial six-month basic course given to all new Marine officers. The Commanding General, Marine Corps Development and Education Command is authorized to nominate 1 percent of the total Reserve officer graduates in a given basic class provided they are in the top 5 percent of their class overall (Distinguished Basic School Graduate (DBSG)).

(B) The Meritorious Augmentation Program

This program permits commands to nominate highly qualified Reserve officers on active duty for augmentation at any time after completion of The Basic School. Commanders are urged to use the utmost discretion in nominating these officers. Meritorious augmentation nominees are considered by the next available ORB. Most importantly, Reserve officers nominated for the meritorious augmentation program are not subject to year group/category constraints. However, due to past abuses of this program there is now a limit that no more than 5 percent of the number of General Augmentation ORB allocations can be given to meritorious nominees. These nominees then compete for meritorious augmentation.

(C) The General Augmentation Program

This program is the primary augmentation program of the Marine Corps. The ORB convenes semi-annually, usually May and November, to review the official records and applications of all officers who apply under the criteria established in Marine Corps Order 1001.45E and separate solicitation bulletins issued by Headquarters Marine Corps (HQMC). The ORB recommends applicants within the quotas by category and year group. The Board is designed to operate such that in any year group and category only the best qualified will be selected in competition with their peers. An officer selected for augmentation by the ORB incurs a 2-year active duty obligation in the Marine Corps from the date of acceptance of appointment as a Regular officer. [Ref. 12:p. 8]

The General Augmentation Program will be the reference program for the remainder of this thesis.

Two other Reserve programs related to augmentation are the Standard Written Agreement (SWAG) and the Extended Active Duty (EAD). The Standard Written Agreement (SWAG) is a contract tendered to a Reserve officer in the Ready Reserve selected for return to active duty. These agreements normally provide for 3 years of active duty. This can be used as a preliminary step for a Reserve officer to get on active duty and then apply for augmentation.

The Extended Active Duty (EAD) is an administrative action deferring the officer's current end of active service (EAS) date up to 1 year upon request or up to 5 years upon recommendation of the ORB pursuant to a request for augmentation. [Ref. 12:p. 9] Most common is the 5 year EAD. EAD's are usually awarded to allow an applicant to improve his evaluated performance, allow the officer another opportunity to augment if his year group is closed and he

shows promise, or to ensure that there are enough officers to fill billet requirements. Back to back EAD's are not awarded. [Ref. 2: p. 15] The 5 year EAD can be adjusted downward to as little as one year at the request of the officer. Some officers do not want to stay the total 5 years but rather stay another 1 or 2 years while continuing to apply for augmentation. [Ref. 13]

Separation pay may be awarded to Reserve officers who have completed 5 or more, but less than 20 years of active service, if they are not accepted for an additional tour of active duty for which they unconditionally volunteered. Unconditional in an augmentation sense means that Reserve officers who request augmentation must agree to serve on EAD if not selected for a Regular commission. An EAD may or may not be offered, but the intent to serve must be included in the application. Separation pay consists of 10 percent of annual basic pay for each year of service up to a maximum of \$30,000.

Another caveat of the General Augmentation Program is the Directed Lateral Move. This means that Reserve officers selected for augmentation can be involuntarily moved to a new MOS. Directed lateral moves are used to staff MOSs that are critically short (less than 85% of requirement) of their Regular officer requirement. [Ref. 2: p. 15] An example of directed lateral moves is shown in Table 5. This Table shows the "over" MOS and the "short" MOS

considerations used in application of Board guidance. Notice that the "over" MOSs are mostly in the Combat Arms. The reason for this "overage" in the combat arms MOS is due to the "pyramid effect" of those specialties. The "pyramid effect" is the name given to the manpower requirement/career path by grade. The requirement for junior officers in the combat arms is very large, due to the high number of billets for those grades. However, as grade increases, the requirement for officers decreases. If a large number of officers were to be left in the "pyramid", time actually spent in a combat arms MOS billet would be drastically reduced in order to give everyone "field" experience. The directed lateral move program is designed to keep the optimal number of officers in each grade in the pyramid in order to maintain sensible job rotation and tenure in the combat arms MOSs, while at the same time alleviating critical shortages in other specialties.

TABLE 5
DIRECTED LATERAL MOVE GUIDELINES FOR
ORB FY 87/1

<u>OVER</u>	<u>% OF REQUIREMENT</u>	<u>SHORT</u>	<u>TOTAL NEEDED</u>
0302 Infantry	220	0202 Intelligence	17
0802 Artillery	230		
1302 Engineer	124		
1802 Tank	328		
1803 Assault Amphib.	314		

[Ref. 14]

The Directed Lateral Move Program is not very popular with junior Reserve officers. Many feel that they were evaluated

in their first MOS and do not desire to switch. However, in order to remain on active duty in the Marine Corps most accept the move. The directed lateral move rejection rate is less than 10 percent.

C. AUGMENTATION QUOTA DETERMINATION

Prior to 1985, augmentation quotas for the ORB were computed by dividing the total available Regular officer vacancies into a specific number per category. For example, if there were 400 projected vacancies, 60 percent of this number would go to the Ground category since the total officer force is composed of 60 percent Ground officers. This was a simple method, but it did not account for category-specific attrition.

The quota determination process currently used by the Marine Corps Officer Plans Section utilizes historic and forecasted losses from the Regular force by category and year group. [Ref. 10: p. 27] The actual computational process is performed through the use of two microcomputer based models, (1) the Marine Corps Officer Rate Projector (MCORP) and (2) the Year Group Model which is part of the Officer Planning and Utility System (OPUS).

MCORP is FORTRAN-77-based model developed by the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), which utilizes historic inventory and attrition data on various populations of Marine Corps officers to generate attrition and continuation rates by grade, by years of commissioned

service, and by category. The model can be tasked to generate this data given the parameters desired. The parameters that can be specified interactively are occupation group, category (i.e., strength, loss, etc.), years of commissioned service (YCS), grade, occupation, source of commission, education, sex, component (Regular, Reserve, both), ethnic group, and service schools attended. There are many menus and submenus from which to choose these parameters. Therefore, the operator can target a specific group within the Marine Corps officer population for analysis. MCORP currently uses the last ten years of historic data to produce an evenly weighted rate or weights that can be user-specified. Table 6 is an illustration of MCORP output.

TABLE 6
EXAMPLE OF MCORP OUTPUT

OCCUPATION GROUP: All
CAT: Strength
YCS: 01 - 09
GRADE: All Unrestricted Officers
OCCUPATION: All
SOURCE: All
EDUCATION: All
SEX: All
COMPONENT: Reserve
ETHNIC: All
SERVICE SCHOOL: Grad + Nograd

TABLE 6
EXAMPLE OF MCORP OUTPUT
(CONT'D)

<u>YEAR</u>	<u>INVENTORY</u>	<u>LOSS</u>	<u>CONT. RATE</u>
77	5273.	851.	0.839
78	5281.	774.	0.853
79	4974.	703.	0.859
80	4590.	553.	0.880
81	4329.	511.	0.882
82	4542.	427.	0.906
83	5003.	477.	0.905
84	5302.	642.	0.879
85	5153.	937.	0.818
86	4494.	863.	0.808

MCORP continuation rates are designed to be an accessible data base for OPUS when it is running the Year Group Model. Presently, continuation rate data is manually input into OPUS.

The Year Group Model was designed by Decision Systems Associates, Inc. As a part of OPUS, the Year Group Model produces output that is used to construct a Year-Group Plan. [Ref. 15] The purpose of the Year Group Plan is to determine optimal manpower figures within each of the five officer categories (Ground, Helo, etc.) such that target force requirements for Majors in each of these categories can be met. Target force requirements are in the form of the Grade Adjusted Recapitulation (GAR). The GAR is the document that specifies the total number of officers in each grade required to fill both primary MOS billets and a fair share of training and other billets outside a specific MOS. The GAR is run at least three times a year and whenever

there is a change to the Authorized Strength Report (ASR). The ASR changes when manpower requirements change in the form of a Table of Organization (T/O) revision.

The Year-Group Model uses fixed promotion and selection rates and flowpoints (as per DOPMA) per officer grade as well as the continuation rates per grade/YCS from MCORP. A steady state methodology is used to reach the solution. The output generated includes the number of accessions needed to meet the GAR-specified major target, as well as the resulting manpower inventory for each grade/YCS. The model ensures that the GAR goal is met for the user-specified grade, but the data for the other grades is usually not met. Additional output provides information regarding manyear averages, projected losses for each grade/YCS as well as the projected promotions per grade and zone. [Ref. 15:p. 2-2]

Table 7 is an output extract from the Year-Group Model of OPUS. The example was run to determine the optimal manpower inventory of fixed-wing pilots given a GAR of 310 in the O-4 target grade. For instance, the promotion flow point to O-5 is 16.4 years, the selection rate above zone is .118 and in-zone is .623. These selection rates produce 1.7 above zone promotions and 24.6 in-zone promotions. Manyears refers to the number of fixed-wing pilots required per year per grade. Accessions in O-1 grade should be 94.8 fixed-wing pilots in order to maintain a GAR of 310.

TABLE 7
YEAR GROUP MODEL OUTPUT FOR FIXED-WING PILOTS
WITH A TARGET GRADE OF O-4 AND GAR OF 310

	<u>01/02</u>	<u>03</u>	<u>04</u>	<u>05</u>	<u>06</u>
Flow Point (YRS)	4.5	10.0	16.4	22.0	27.0
Selection Rate					
Above Zone	.322	.238	.118	.093	.018
In Zone	.947	.720	.623	.532	.056
Promotions					
Above Zone	1.1	3.6	1.7	.4	.1
In Zone	79.9	42.2	24.6	8.3	.3
Manyyears	416.8	382.7	310.0	141.2	48.3
Losses	13.8	35.2	19.5	17.6	8.4
Accessions	94.8				

Distribution
(# REQUIRED PER GRADE AND YCS)

<u>YCS/YG</u>	<u>01/02</u>	Grade <u>03</u>	<u>04</u> (Target group)	<u>Total</u>
1	94.4	0	0	94.4
2	93.5	0	0	93.5
3	92.5	0	0	92.5
4	90.0	0	0	90.0
5	45.3	39.4	0	84.7
6	1.1	75.2	0	76.3
7	0	69.9	0	69.9
8	0	65.5	0	65.5

The total column in Table 7 provides key information used in augmentation quota determination. Since the category was pre-selected as fixed-wing pilots, the total column specifies the number of Regular fixed-wing pilots required in each YCS and Grades O-1, O-2 and O-3 to meet the Regular fixed-wing pilot GAR for Majors of 310 in steady state. These figures are subsequently compared against on-board Regular officer strengths for the specific category to

determine where potential shortages exist. The total column is treated as a "ceiling" figure. [Ref. 1]

The shortages determined by the comparison of the Year-Group Model output and on-board strength are used to set augmentation quotas. The first semi-annual ORB is given a quota using exactly the difference in the figures. For example, the November ORB would get a quota of 3 Fixed-Wing augmentation slots if the on-board Regular Fixed-Wing pilot strength was 87 in YG4, and the total column of the Year-Group Model output specifies 90. For the first semi-annual ORB the following equation applies:

$$\begin{array}{lcl} \text{Augmentation} & \text{Year Group Model} & \text{Regular On-} \\ \text{Quota for} & = \text{Optimal Strength for} & - \text{Board Grade/YG} \\ \text{That Category} & \text{Grade/YG} & \text{Strength} \end{array}$$

The quotas for the second semi-annual ORB, which meets in May, adjust the Year-Group Model output for the seasonal fluctuations in officer attrition. The Marine Corps Officer Plans Section utilizes another model which also computes historic year-group attrition. The Officer Rate Generator (ORG) computes historic average attrition rates by dividing the total number of those who left by the total on-board strengths for that period. What is desired is to forecast the number of officers expected to leave the service during the period and adjust augmentation quotas accordingly. For example, if the model determined that historically 60% of the attrition for YCS 3 occurs in the summer, and our projected losses for the year were 2 officers, the

requirement would then be adjusted down to 89 officers (90-1). This figure would then be compared with the on-board strength and a ORB ceiling set. In this way, the second semi-annual ORB assesses actual losses and adjusts the "ceiling" figures up or down as required to ensure steady state GAR goals.

YG vacancies are normally spread over several ORBs to ensure that each officer has an opportunity to compete for the available slots. This is necessary because of variations in MOS training time, which in turn causes variations in FMF and "observed" time. The FMF time variations cause officers in the same category/YG to meet the minimum eligibility criteria for augmentation at different points in their careers. A category/YG "opens" and "closes" to applicants based on attrition fluctuations. Year groups with vacancies are considered and "opened" from their third through eighth YCS to satisfy the 11th year Regular force requirement. [Ref. 10:p. 27]

In summary, the Marine Corps has made an excellent transition to using microcomputer-based models and setting augmentation quotas based on category-specific attrition. OPUS and MCORP were designed to work in concert. Unfortunately, a few "bugs" need to be worked out for this to materialize. The concept and methodology of augmentation quota determination is sound. All that remains is some model refinement and interfacing work.

D. THE CANDIDATE

Generally only company-grade officers (O-1 thru O-3) with a minimum of 12 months observed fitness reports, on active duty and in a year-group and category designated as "open" are eligible to apply for augmentation. Some field grade officers (O-4 and above) are also eligible to apply if they have not failed selection for promotion to the next higher field grade and are Extended Duty or Career Reservists on the active duty list of the Marine Corps. This provides a sort of "grandfather" clause to pre-DOPMA officers. Exact guidelines relevant to each ORB are sent out in the semi-annual Marine Corps Bulletin 1040 (Appendix A). [Ref. 16] This bulletin specifies the open and closed year groups by category, the MOSs over or undermanned, and announces recent updates to Marine Corps Order 1001.45E. The officers in "open" MOSs who are applying for augmentation must select two MOSs from the "short" list to be used as a guide for the ORB in recommending a possible directed lateral move of an officer chosen for augmentation.

Competition for general augmentation quotas is on a "best qualified" basis within year groups and categories. Factors considered by the ORB are the individual's performance and potential as indicated by fitness reports, command endorsements, awards, educational background and TBS standing. If an officer is not selected, he may resubmit a request for augmentation to the next ORB. If an applicant

is not selected but determined by the ORB to be potentially suitable for augmentation, an Extension of Active Duty (EAD) may be awarded to allow more time for improvement of his evaluated performance if he is close to his End of Active Service (EAS). The awarding of EAD is also competitive among augmentation applicants.

Two recent changes to the augmentation order have assisted officers attempting to augment. First, Meritorious Augmentation Program nominees are now eligible to go before consecutive ORBs instead of once a year. This allows a consistently high performer additional opportunity to augment, especially if he belongs to a closed year group or category. Secondly, officers who were not eligible to apply for augmentation when their year group/category was open (due to training pipeline length) are now authorized to submit applications for augmentation if they are near the end of their active service commitment. These applicants may even submit if their year group/category is currently closed. This caveat applies mostly to student naval aviators who drop from flight school and must retrain in another MOS. This allows every officer who desires to augment at least one chance to apply.

E. THE OFFICER RETENTION BOARD (ORB)

The ORB is composed of 12 members generally representing all competitive categories. A Brigadier General is the president of the Board and all other Board members range in

grade from Colonel to Major. The Board normally is in session for one month and meets during the months of November and May. [Ref. 2:p. 16]

The Board officers undergo numerous briefings regarding various aspects of MOS career patterns, unique MOS qualifications, etc. This provides insight into those MOSs that are unfamiliar to some Board members. The "discovery process" is the period of time when Board members review the cases and put together briefs on each applicant. Consequently, each Board member is able to present a concise, objective brief on each applicant, regardless of MOS. Board members also take into account how fitness reports are written and the nuances of the evaluation system. Unnecessary "fluff" is discarded. Each applicant is assigned a member of the Board to be his "briefer". The briefer reviews the applicant's Officer Military Personnel File (OMPF), Master Brief Sheet (MBS), and application with photograph. [Ref. 10:p. 28]

The OMPF contains microfiche copies of all fitness reports to date and other important documents pertinent to an officer's career. The MBS is a short historical synopsis of section B of the fitness reports, listings of schools and awards, and other notable items. The MBS condenses the OMPF and other data to enable the briefer to observe any trends in an officer's performance. Each briefer handles approximately 40 - 60 cases, so the MBS is a useful aid in keeping the briefer focused.

F. SELECTION

Each briefer "sells" his applicant to remaining Board members using certain criteria. According to Mills [Ref. 13], the criteria in order of importance are:

- (1) officer record/credibility in MOS
- (2) endorsements from the chain of command
- (3) TBS ranking
- (4) MOS/follow-on schools ranking
- (5) miscellaneous noteworthy accomplishments

The officer's record, based on the OMPF and MBS, is used to assess the observed performance of the officer, billets held, and relative ranking among peers as perceived by the reporting senior (who writes the fitness report). This criterion is the most important factor in determining selection for augmentation.

Next, the endorsements from those in the applicant's chain of command are reviewed. Comprehensive recommendations by commanders in the endorsing chain of command are a vital part of the application as a real-time evaluation of an individual's performance and potential as a career Marine officer. These are of great value to the ORB. [Ref. 2:p. 11] Recommendations are usually based on personal interviews with the applicant. An applicant is

recommended including one of the following four endorsements:

- a. recommended with enthusiasm; or
- b. recommended with confidence; or
- c. recommended with reservation; or
- d. not recommended.

The Board would have to have other strong performance data to select an individual with an endorsement other than (a) above. Competition for augmentation is keen, therefore a "lukewarm" endorsement does not work in the officer's favor. Another important endorsement, though not specified in the order, is the ranking of the applicant by the Division/Wing commander among the other applicants from that unit. This is a heavily weighted item by the board members. [Ref. 13] This ranking is considered important because it is based on previous endorsements from the chain of command and on the personal interview of a General officer (usually the Assistant Division/Wing Commander). A high ranking among the other applicants is a definite "plus" for the officer.

TBS, MOS and follow-on schools, and miscellaneous notable items are used to "flesh-out" the applicant's brief. For example, special qualifications, the photograph and any off-duty education are among the items considered.

Once the applicants that are to be augmented are chosen, the Board then decides who will be recommended for a directed lateral move to an undermanned MOS. Recently, less

than five percent of the officers selected for augmentation are recommended for a directed lateral move. An applicant can decline the directed lateral move, but in turn forfeits augmentation and is released from active duty upon expiration of active service.

In summary, the process is run in a very fair and professional manner. The Board receives guidance from both the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps and is bound by oath. In reviewing the Board process, there is little that can be criticized as being capricious or cursory. Frequently, incomplete records hurt an applicants augmentation chances far more than any Board bias could. [Ref. 13]

G. ORB RESULTS FOR FY 1983 - 1987

Table 8 presents some of the key statistics from ORBs 83/2 to 87/2.

TABLE 8
KEY STATISTICS FOR THE 83/2 THROUGH 87/2 ORBS

A. OVERALL RETENTION

<u>BOARD</u>	<u>APPLICANTS</u>	<u>#AUG.</u>	<u>#EAD</u>	<u>%AUG (#AUG/ b).</u>	<u>%RET (#AUG + EAD)/a</u>
87/2	a)*658 b)437	185	20	42.3	31.2
87/1	a)600 b)441	222	20	50.3	40.3
86/2	a)887 b)821	505	73	62.0	65.0
86/1	a)946 b)946	199	25	21.0	23.7
85/2	a)1077 b)739	185	17	25.0	18.7
85/1	a)902 b)622	134	15	21.5	16.5

TABLE 8
KEY STATISTICS FOR THE 83/2 THROUGH 87/2 ORBS
CONT'D

<u>BOARD</u>	<u>APPLICANTS</u>	<u>#AUG.</u>	<u>#EAD</u>	<u>%AUG (#AUG/ b)</u>	<u>%RET (#AUG + EAD)/a</u>
84/2	1266	367	96	28.9	36.5
84/1	1227	299	101	24.3	32.5
83/2	1210	345	142	28.5	11.7

*a = Open/Closed YG(AUG/EAD) b = Open YG only (AUG only)

B. AUGMENTATION BY CATEGORY - (Open Year Groups and Meritorious Augmentation in Closed Year Groups)

<u>BOARD</u>	<u>JA</u>	<u>% OPPORTUNITY</u>		<u>FW</u>	<u>GRND</u>
		<u>NFO</u>	<u>HELO</u>		
87/2	81.3	50.0	8.2	30.1	49.5
87/1	61.1	80.0	27.7	60.4	54.0
86/2	73.0	67.0	56.0	62.0	62.0
86/1	45.8	50.0	29.7	21.9	28.0
85/2	25.8	4.8	20.0	5.1	19.3
85/1	5.3	0	9.1	1.0*	10.3
84/2	31.2	11.4	15.4	12.6	27.7
84/1	33.3	20.0	26.2	15.8	24.0
83/2	26.7	14.0	19.4	19.2	25.1

*most officers in this category were in closed year groups

C. MINORITY AUGMENTATION (APPLICANTS/%AUGMENTED)

<u>BOARD</u>	<u>BLACK</u>	<u>HISPANIC</u>	<u>ASIAN</u>	<u>WOMEN</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
87/2	44/31.8	16/37.5	9/44.4	21/52.4	69/34.8
87/1	44/36.4	7/57.1	9/44.4	17/52.9	60/40.0
86/2	49/45.0	17/65.0	9/33.0	27/89.0	75/48.0
86/1	48/20.8	18/22.2	9/0	26/38.5	77/19.5
85/2	47/21.3	7/14.3	4/0	53/38.0	59/18.6
85/1	33/18.2	9/11.0	8/12.5	36/22.0	51/15.7
84/2	60/18.3	--	--	54/46.3	114/31.6
84/1	48/18.8	--	--	--	59/16.9
83/2	48/29.2	--	--	--	--

TABLE 8
KEY STATISTICS FOR THE 83/2 THROUGH 87/2 ORBS
CONT'D

D. MERITORIOUS AUGMENTATION (FIELD/CLOSED YEAR GROUPS)

<u>BOARD</u>	<u>NOMINEES</u>	<u>AUGMENTED</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>GEN AUG %</u>
87/2	150	12	8.0	42.3
87/1	100	72	72.0	50.3
86/2	62	51	70.8	62.0
86/1	66	44	67.0	21.0

E. DIRECTED LATERAL MOVES

<u>BOARD</u>	<u># RECOMMENDED TO MOVE</u>
87/2	4
87/1	10
86/2	141
86/1	63

F. TBS AUGMENTATION (100% AUGMENTED)

<u>BOARD</u>	<u># NOMINATED</u>
87/2	5
87/1	5
86/2	8
86/1	6
85/2	13
85/1*	57
84/2	100
84/1	41
83/2	71

*First year that some constraint was placed on the number of TBS augmentees.

[Ref. 1]

In summary, this chapter has explained augmentation and its concept, methods, quota determination, eligibility requirements, the ORB, selection process, and presented the results for the past nine ORB's.

Chapter IV outlines a framework for a detailed analysis of augmentation as a manpower management process.

IV. A FRAMEWORK FOR AN ANALYSIS OF THE AUGMENTATION PROCESS

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to assess the effectiveness or efficiency of any manpower management policy, a comprehensive analysis of the principal components of the policy must be undertaken. In the previous three chapters, a review of the relevant literature and a detailed description of the augmentation process identified many fruitful areas of potential research. The intent of this chapter is to provide a description of the key areas requiring research and some of the considerations that should be incorporated in each.

B. ANALYZING THE REGULAR COMMISSION

The first area of analysis should be the basic building block of the officer corps -- the Regular commission. Since a Regular commission is the goal of many junior Reserve officers, it is logical to analyze this type of commission and its relationship to augmentation. In this regard, a formal policy analysis should be undertaken to provide the justification for awarding a Regular commission, to determine when to award it in an officer's career, and to determine the best officer force structure by type of commission. For instance, should all new Marine officers be commissioned as Reservists as proposed by Hammes? [Ref. 7]

What would be the negative spillover effects of this policy? One undesirable effect might occur if, during wartime, a large number of these Reserve officers left upon expiration of their contract. A Reserve commission does not have the caveat, like a Regular commission, regarding conditional release from active duty. A Regular officer serves at the pleasure of the President of the United States, and as such, must request release from active duty. Release from active duty can be refused in time of national emergency. Though this option has not been widely exercised in the past, it provides the Marine Corps (and the other branches as well) with a way to prevent substantial attrition from the junior officer corps.

Another policy analysis issue regarding the Regular commission would be determining what is the optimal mix of Regular and Reserve officers. In addition to the officer corps stability issue mentioned in the preceding paragraph, some other considerations should enter into the analysis of the optimal commission mix. For example, some basic cost-benefit considerations of the Regular versus Reserve commission for junior officers would provide a method for determining an optimal mix. The costs should include not only monetary expenditures, but opportunity or social costs as well. What are the cost/benefit tradeoffs between Reserve and Regular commissions? An example of a cost/benefit trade-off in awarding the Regular commission

concerns the tenure of a Regular officer. Since the first true screening of Regular officers occurs at the Major selection board, does the cost of allowing some Regular officers who are marginal performers remain on active duty for approximately 12 years outweigh the benefit of junior officer stability that the Regular commission provides? Another cost question is whether or not the Marine Corps recoups the accession and training costs of Reserve and Regular officers. Which, if any, type of commission allows us to recoup these costs faster? Is the Regular commission awarded to Naval Academy/NROTC graduates based upon the need to provide enough time to recoup accession costs or to provide a non-economic career incentive? In human capital investment terms, does the Marine Corps generate a return on its investment in Regular and Reserve officers? If so, how much of a return and which type of commission generates the larger return?

Cost-benefit analysis is but one of many considerations that should be included in a policy study of Regular versus Reserve commissions. Other considerations might include career incentives, stability (as previously mentioned), flexibility, retention, and performance.

Performance is difficult to quantify; however, an analysis of Regular versus Reserve junior officer performance could provide further justification for awarding, or not awarding, Regular commissions to Naval

Academy/NROTC graduates. The theme of the literature reviewed in Chapter II of this thesis centered on the issue of awarding Regular commissions to Naval Academy/NROTC graduates. While Regular commission sources could easily form a policy analysis in itself, the Marine Corps could make some preliminary assessments of performance from existing internal personnel files. A study to determine any performance differences in junior officers by type of commission could provide the Marine Corps with an analytical base for its Regular commissioning policy regarding Naval Academy/NROTC graduates. It is this policy that is most often criticized when augmentation opportunities decrease.

An example of the type of analysis that could be used in a performance assessment would utilize Section B of the officer fitness reports. Though not a perfect measure, Section B marks would provide the only quantifiable performance data readily available for analysis. A CHI-square analysis could be used to determine if there is a statistically significant difference between the performance of junior officers by type of commission. By quantifying each mark in Section B [see Appendix B] (ex. Outstanding = 9, Excellent = 7, etc.) and computing either a straight additive "performance index" or a "weighted performance index" for each officer, the performance of officers initially commissioned into Regular Marine Corps could be compared with those holding Reserve commissions. The

weighted performance index would assign a greater weight to items in Section B considered more important. For example, performance of "regular duties" would outweigh "additional duties". The data is easily extracted from the Automated Fitness Report file (AFR) and could be merged with officer demographic data from the Headquarters Master File (HMF).

This analysis could be conducted on either a sample of junior officers or the entire population in the O1 - O3 grades. If there were a statistically significant difference between the performance of Naval Academy/NROTC graduates and Reserve officers, this would provide justification for continuing or revising the current Regular commissioning policy, based on which group performed better. For example, if Naval Academy/NROTC graduates performed worse than Reserve officers, then the automatic awarding of Regular commissions to this group should be reassessed. Without some analytical basis for justifying the current policy, subjective assessments will continue to obscure the issue.

A study by HQMC Code MPI-20 [Ref. 17], used selection rates to Major as a performance measure and compared those officers initially receiving Regular commissions (Naval Academy/NROTC) with those officers who were augmented into the Regular Marine Corps. The study found that those officers who were augmented had a statistically greater rate of selection to Major. However, this study is inconclusive

because it used a population of officers who had been "purified" by the augmentation board. One would expect that those who pass a screening process like augmentation would have a better record, on average, with which to compete. For this reason, the analysis proposed here would use junior Regular and Reserve officers (prior to augmentation) and their performance profiles provided by the fitness report.

This proposed analysis is but one of many variations that could be used to justify current Regular commissioning policy. Since junior Regular officers occupy potential augmentation quotas, it is important that the Marine Corps have an analytical basis for its Regular officer commissioning policy.

This section has provided the first step in an augmentation policy analysis by outlining a study of the Regular commission and suggesting questions that should be answered. Once the Marine Corps has justified the Regular commissioning of Naval Academy/NROTC graduates and determined the optimal Reserve/Regular mix, it then has the basic foundation upon which to formulate/revise other officer management policies, like augmentation.

C. ANALYSIS OF NEEDS

Although augmentation opportunity is affected by Regular officer attrition, manpower requirements also play an important role. Describing the determination of manpower requirements is an issue beyond the scope of this thesis.

However, a recent GAO study [Ref. 18] found that the quantitative process the Marine Corps uses to determine manpower requirements for non-FMF units and administrative and support components of FMF units has shortcomings. The report states that the basis of many Marine Corps staffing standards is unclear. Of the standards they reviewed, GAO found that almost one-third showed no indication that they were based on workload, and none were based on methods improvement studies [Ref. 18:p. 3]. Instead, they were based on the judgment of Marine Corps officers or on formulas of "indeterminable origin". GAO states that the problems with the manpower requirements processes used by the Marine Corps stem from inadequate oversight. The Marine Corps has no specific guidance on when or how the various determination processes should be used and documented. [Ref. 18:p. 3] Nor does it sufficiently coordinate or monitor the processes the various organizations use to determine their manpower needs.

GAO did not want to create the impression that Marine Corps manpower determinations were arbitrary and uncoordinated, but rather lacking program guidance, work measurement methods, and documentation.

The lack of oversight and documentation in manpower requirements determination creates a doubt about the accuracy of these "requirements". Poor requirements determination could be a significant contributor to the

decline in augmentation opportunity and/or adversely affect promotion timing and flowpoint. For example, if the requirements for company-grade officers (O1-O3) is overstated and the requirement for field-grade officers is understated, a bottleneck can result in both lower augmentation opportunity and a lower promotion rate.

It is difficult for the Marine Corps to assert that augmentation opportunity is either sufficient or insufficient when it has questionable requirements because of how they were determined. Does the Marine Corps really need the number of junior Reserve officers it says it needs? The analysis that could be applied in this area would be to review company-grade officer requirements and the justifications for them. Ultimately, this clarification of needs and the previous analysis regarding Regular commissions expands the base of knowledge for an augmentation policy review.

Along with the justification of needs, the Marine Corps could benefit from studying the factors which affect junior officer retention. Since retention is a key factor in determining augmentation quotas, an analysis of Marine officer retention could provide some insight. Retention does not have to be a problem in order to justify its study. Rather than wait for a problem to develop, documenting the effect of various factors on the retention of junior officers, and its ultimate impact on augmentation

opportunity, can provide manpower policy planners with the tools necessary to foresee the "peaks and valleys" in retention. For instance, the Marine Corps could develop a "retention early warning system" that would provide planners with specific indicators that affect retention. For example, an indicator might be the economy's impact on retention. Some measures of the state of the economy might be the growth rate of GNP or the rate of civilian unemployment. There is a "general feeling" that retention is partially tied to how well the economy is doing, but what are the effects on Marine officer retention? What is the magnitude of this effect? An econometric model regressing the junior officer retention rate on various economic indicators, such as GNP growth rates and the unemployment rate, could be used to develop junior officer retention elasticities which can be used for forecasting likely future retention. This would allow planners to forecast accession/augmentation quotas in the outyears.

The ultimate goal in analyzing retention factors and their magnitude is to try to plan accessions and forecast potential future requirements in order to smooth out the fluctuations in augmentation opportunity. The Marine Corps may find this knowledge of retention not only helpful in studying augmentation, but in many other areas as well.

D. ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT AUGMENTATION SITUATION

The Marine Corps may find that an analysis of the effects of current augmentation policy could prove helpful in assessing whether further study is warranted. A question frequently asked is "Are we keeping the best junior officers?" A definition of the "best" is difficult; however, performance is one of the suggested measures.

The study previously proposed for analyzing the performance of Regular versus Reserve junior officers could easily be applied to assess the quality of junior officers retained or released. The two populations of interest would be junior Regular officers who remain on active duty and those Reserve officers who failed augmentation. The key question is which population consists of better performers, or are they equal? The methodology for a study of this type would consist of the same Section B fitness report marks used before in computing either an additive performance index or a weighted performance index. It is important to note that this comparison should be done by year group and category in order to be consistent. This would reduce extraneous factors such as age/MOS etc., from contaminating the results.

The indices could be computed for each officer and a Chi-square test run to determine if there is a statistical difference between the two groups. Once again, the data is readily available and easy to quantify. A quality

difference in favor of Reserve officers who failed augmentation would have significant negative implications regarding the Regular commissioning policy of Naval Academy/NROTC graduates. If the Regular officers who remained on active duty were the superior performers, then the awarding of Regular commissions to these officers is justified.

A tertiary analysis to this one could use those Reserve officers who were augmented as one group and those not augmented as the other to see if the process selects the best qualified. However, a major drawback of this analysis would be the inability to quantify such items as special qualifications, awards, and endorsements.

A second analysis for assessing the current augmentation situation could utilize an econometric regression model with augmentation as a limited dependent variable. If an officer successfully augmented the dependent variable would equal one. If the officer failed augmentation, the variable would equal zero. This dependent variable would be regressed on such independent variables as age, marital status, ethnic code, source of commission, sex, MOS, GCT, and other pertinent variables such as the performance index. A Probit or Logit model could be utilized. The variables found significant and their coefficients could provide substantial insight into the factors that help determine whether an officer will be successful at augmentation or not. In turn,

this knowledge would also let Marine Corps manpower planners establish a profile of a successful Reserve officer. This profile would be helpful in officer recruiting.

E. ALTERNATIVE AUGMENTATION POLICIES

The last area for analysis in the framework involves analyzing the various alternative augmentation policies. For example, what would be the impact of augmentation on an all-qualified basis? What is the optimal amount of augmentation opportunity? 20 percent? 50 percent? Each alternative should be studied in a policy analysis which would include costs/benefits, major problem areas, and the feasibility of such a policy.

There are many ways to enhance augmentation opportunity or redesign the system in order to allow it to be perceived as more fair. Rather than short point papers, a formal policy analysis of each proposed alternative would at least provide more information upon which to base a decision.

In summary, this chapter has presented a framework for the types of studies that could be undertaken in assessing the Marine Corps augmentation system. None of the proposed analyses would require extraordinary cost or effort, but could easily reap benefits of great magnitude. If the Marine Corps determines that augmentation should be reviewed and analyzed, then this framework will provide a starting point from which to begin.

The next chapter presents an example of the type of analysis that can be done to explore some of the effects of augmentation policy.

V. DATA AND ANALYSIS

This Chapter presents an example of the type of analysis that can be used in evaluating the augmentation system. Resource limitations have precluded this analysis from using the extensive databases suggested in the previous chapter. Instead, I have chosen to examine the Officer Exit Surveys for fiscal years 1985 and 1986.

A. DATA

The Officer Exit Survey is a questionnaire administered by HQMC to all officers who are leaving the Marine Corps. The survey, developed by Mr. William Giffens of the Naval Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), is similar to exit surveys used by the other services. The average usable response rate on the Marine officer questionnaire is approximately 30% of the total number of officers who leave per year. Appendix C is a copy of the survey.

The exit survey lists 34 categories which an officer rates anywhere from "extremely important" to "not true or of no importance" based upon how important he felt the item to be in his decision to leave the Marine Corps. After answering each question, the departing officer ranks what he feels are the 3 most important reasons, of the 34, affecting his decision to leave. These responses are collated and

kept in a database at HQMC. A standard SAS program called SYNCSORT developed by the Defense Manpower Data Center (DMDC) is used to process the responses and generate reports.

For purposes of this thesis, in addition to the survey responses, a merge with the Headquarters Master File (HMF) was performed in order to match relevant demographic data to each survey respondent. Additionally, another merge was performed to match this new composite file with each officer's Section B Fitness Report readouts from the Automated Fitness Report File (AFR). The end result is a file which contains each officer's exit survey responses, relevant demographic data, and a performance profile from the fitness reports.

The Section B Fitness Report data was assigned a numerical score for each mark. Appendix B contains a complete officer fitness report. Section B is the relevant part of the report, specifically items 13A - 13G (performance criteria), 14A - 14N (personal qualities), 15A (general value to service), and 16 (service in war). The numerical values assigned to each mark are depicted in Table 9.

TABLE 9
FITNESS REPORT MARK NUMERICAL CONVERSIONS
(13A-G, 14A-N)

<u>ORIGINAL MARK</u>	<u>ALPHA-NUMERIC SCORE</u>
Not Observed	N
Unsatisfactory	0
Below Average	1
Average	3
Above Average	5
Excellent	7
Outstanding	9

Item 15A requires the additional values 2, 4, 6, and 8 to provide an interval scale to match the corresponding responses. Item 16 is graded N or the values 6-9 to correspond to each response regarding service in wartime. For example, "prefer not" =6, "particularly desire" =9, and "not observed" would equal "N".

The relevant demographic data on each officer consists of the variables specified in Table 10.

TABLE 10
RELEVANT DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES EXTRACTED FROM
THE HMF FOR EACH SURVEY RESPONDENT

Component Code	Former Duty Station (MCC)
Accompanied/Unaccompanied	Fiscal Yr/Qtr Separated
Date of Separation	Grade
Date of Birth	GT/GCT Score
Date of Enlistment	Marital Status
Date of Rank	Current Command (MCC)
Duty Status Code	MOS
End of Active Service	Population Group
End Current Contract	Race Code
Education Level	Separation Code
Ethnic Code	Sex
Source of Entry	Years of Education
Separation Type	

B. METHODOLOGY

The analysis will use this composite data file to search for differences in two subgroups of this data population. The first group will be those Reserve officers who failed augmentation or were denied Extended Active Duty (EAD). For purposes of this thesis, I will assume that those denied EAD are also those Reserve officers who failed to augment. These officers are assigned a Separation Designation Code of LGJ1 - LGJ4 in the data set. The second group to be analyzed contains those Regular officers who resigned their commissions (Component Code 11).

The analysis will consist of the computation of frequencies and cross-tabulations within each subgroup, and then various comparisons between the two groups will be made. The standard SAS program (SYNCSORT) for the survey responses will be run on the members of each group in order to compare their reasons for leaving.

One of the highlights of this analysis is the comparison of performance data. This will be performed using a SAS program to compute a straight additive performance index and a weighted performance index. These performance indices take each observed mark in Section B of the fitness reports on each officer, with its corresponding numerical value, and divide it by the total number of marks for the report. The weighted performance index multiplies each numerical score by a weight which reflects the relative importance of the

item in the whole report. For example, "performance of regular duties" is weighted more heavily (7) than "performance of additional duties" (1). Table 11 specifies the exact weighting scale as proposed by HQMC Code MA-20.

TABLE 11
WEIGHTING SCHEME FOR A PERFORMANCE INDEX

ITEM	WEIGHT
13a. Performance of Regular Duties	7
13b. Performance of Additional Duties	1
13c. Performance of Administrative Duties	3
13d. Handling Officers	3
13e. Handling Enlisted Personnel	1
13f. Training Personnel	4
13g. Tactical Handling of Troops	4
14a. Endurance	3
14b. Personal Appearance	4
14c. Military Presence	3
14d. Attention to Duty	6
14e. Cooperation	4
14f. Initiative	6
14g. Judgment	6
14h. Presence of Mind (Combat)	4
14i. Force	4
14j. Leadership	5
14k. Loyalty	4
14l. Personal Relations	3
14m. Economy of Management	1
14n. Growth Potential	5
15a. General Value to the Service	6
16. Service in Wartime	5

The performance indices will be computed for each officer and aggregated as a group to compare the performance of Regular officers who resigned and Reserve officers who failed augmentation or in a request for EAD. CHI-Square and T-Tests will be used to test the null hypothesis that there

is no statistically significant difference in the performance of Regular officers who resigned and Reserve officers who failed augmentation/EAD.

C. RESULTS

Tables 12 thru 14 contain the results of the statistical tests.

TABLE 12
REGULAR VERSUS NON-AUGMENTED RESERVE OFFICER
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA

A. Sex

	Regular		Reserve	
	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Freq</u>	<u>%</u>
Male	237	92.9	231	93.9
Female	18	7.1	15	6.1

B. Marital Status

Divorced	11	4.3	4	1.6
Married	180	70.6	128	52.0
Single	64	25.1	114	46.3

C. Race

Caucasian	238	93.3	226	91.9
Black	16	6.3	16	6.5
Oriental	NA	-	1	.4
Other	1	.4	3	1.2

D. Education Level

Baccalaureate	234	91.8	231	93.9
Masters	14	5.5	8	3.3
Professional	7	2.7	7	2.8

E. Grade

O2	53	21.0	107	43.5
O3	202	79.0	139	56.5

TABLE 12 .
REGULAR VERSUS NON-AUGMENTED RESERVE OFFICER
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (CONT'D)

F. Military Occupational Specialties
(Those with frequencies ≥ 10)

1. Regular Officers (N = 255)

<u>MOS</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>%</u>
0302 Infantry	36	14.1
3002 Ground Supply	17	6.7
0802 Artillery	11	4.3
0402 Logistics	11	4.3
2502 Communications	11	4.3
1302 Engineer	10	3.9
7523 F/A-18 Pilot	10	3.9
All other (Freq <10 and % <3.9)	149	58.5

2. Reserve Officers (N = 246)

<u>MOS</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>%</u>
0302 Infantry	36	14.6
7562 CH-46 Helo Pilot	28	11.4
7564 CH-53 Helo Pilot	25	10.2
0802 Artillery	19	7.7
2502 Communications	14	5.7
3002 Ground Supply	12	4.9
7501 A-4 Pilot	11	4.5
All other (Freq <10 and % <4.0)	101	41.0

G. Source of Entry (Top 4 Sources)

1. Regular Officers

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>%</u>
NROTC Scholarship	66	25.9
Naval Academy	43	16.9
Platoon Leaders Class - Aviation*	16	6.3
Platoon Leaders Class - Ground*	12	4.7

* = originally Reserve officers who augmented later

TABLE 12
REGULAR VERSUS NON-AUGMENTED RESERVE OFFICER
DATA ANALYSIS RESULTS
DEMOGRAPHIC DATA (CONT'D)

2. Reserve Officers

<u>SOURCE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>%</u>
Officer Candidate School	83	34.0
Platoon Leaders Class - Aviation	64	26.0
Platoon Leaders Class - Ground	46	19.0
Woman Officer Candidate Class	11	4.5

H. Average GCT Scores

	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std Dev</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>	<u>Std Error</u>
Regular	132.73	11.92	102.0	158.0	.76
Reserve	126.87	10.33	86.0	151.0	.68

GCT T-Test Results

<u>Variances</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Degrees of Freedom</u>	<u>Prob > T </u>
Unequal	5.7492	470.6	0.0001
Equal	5.7304	475.0	0.0001

Therefore, the T-Test indicates no statistically significant difference in the GCT scores between Regular and Reserve officers in the sample.

TABLE 13
SURVEY RESPONSES - THE TOP 10 REASONS GIVEN
FOR LEAVING THE MARINE CORPS BY TYPE OF COMMISSION

	<u>Reason</u>	
<u>Rank</u>	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
1	Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation	Lack of confidence in the fairness of the fitness report system
2	Poor utilization of skills, abilities, education	Lack of confidence in the fairness of selection methods
3	Too much family separation	Too much crises management

TABLE 13
SURVEY RESPONSES - THE TOP 10 REASONS GIVEN
FOR LEAVING THE MARINE CORPS BY TYPE OF COMMISSION
(CONT'D)

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Regular</u>	<u>Reserve</u>
4	Too much crises management	Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation
5	Lack of confidence in the fairness of selection methods	Poor utilization of skills, abilities, and education
6	Lack of confidence in the fairness of the fitness report system	Too much paperwork (admin tasks, inspection, procedures)
7	Geographic Instability	Unable to sufficiently plan and control my career
8	Lack of opportunity for accelerated promotion	Too much family separation
9	Unable to sufficiently plan and control my career	Insufficient personnel/equipment support
10	Too much paperwork (admin tasks, inspections, procedures)	Possible erosion of benefits (medical, commissary, etc.)

TABLE 14
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS

A. T-TESTS OF OVERALL AVERAGE PERFORMANCE BY GROUP

<u>Straight Additive Performance Index (PI)</u>					
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std Dev</u>	<u>Std Error</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>
Regular	8.32	.89	.04	1.21	9.00
Reserve	8.20	.81	.03	2.05	9.00

	<u>Variance</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Degrees of Freedom</u>	<u>Prob > T </u>
Regular	Unequal	2.69	1042.5	.007
Reserve	Equal	2.78	1552.0	.006

TABLE 14
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS (CONT'D)

<u>Weighted Performance Index (PI WGTEd)</u>					
	<u>Mean</u>	<u>Std Dev</u>	<u>Std Error</u>	<u>Min</u>	<u>Max</u>
Regular	35.27	3.95	.16	4.21	43.14
Reserve	34.81	3.57	.11	8.77	48.00

	<u>Variance</u>	<u>T</u>	<u>Degrees of Freedom</u>	<u>Prob > T </u>
Regular	Unequal	2.26	1043.2	.024
Reserve	Equal	2.33	1552.0	.020

B. CHI-SQUARE ANALYSIS

1. Straight Additive Performance Index (PI) Assumptions

If $0 < PI < 1$ then performance was unsatisfactory
 If $1 < PI < 5$ then performance was below avg or avg
 If $5 < PI < 7$ then performance was above average
 If $7 < PI < 8.5$ then performance was excellent
 If $8.5 < PI < 9.0$ then performance was outstanding

Note: There were 0 unsatisfactory reports using the straight additive performance index

<u>Status</u> Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	<u>PERFORMANCE (PI)</u>					
	B&Avg	Above	Excel	Outst	Total	
	Regular	7	22	212	191	432
		0.54	1.71	16.46	14.83	33.54
		1.62	5.09	49.07	44.21	
	41.18	33.85	29.40	39.38		
Reserve	10	43	509	294	856	
	0.78	3.34	39.52	22.83	66.46	
	1.17	5.02	59.46	34.35		
	58.82	66.15	70.60	60.62		
Total	17	65	721	485	1288	
	1.32	5.05	55.98	37.66	100.00	

	<u>DF</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Prob</u>
Chi-Square Statistic	3	13.41	.004

TABLE 14
PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS (CONT'D)

2. Weighted Performance Index (PI WGTED)
Assumptions

If 10.00 < PI WGTED < 20.00 then performance was unsatisfactory
 If 20.00 < PI WGTED < 30.00 then performance was below avg and avg
 If 30.00 < PI WGTED < 35.00 then performance was above avg
 If 35.00 < PI WGTED < 40.00 then performance was excellent
 If 40.00 < PI WGTED < 45.00 then performance was outstanding

Status Frequency Percent Row Pct Col Pct	WEIGHTED PERFORMANCE (PI WGTED)					
	Unsat	B&Ave	Above	Excel	Outst	Total
Regular	5 0.33 0.91 35.71	27 1.76 4.94 33.75	147 9.58 26.87 29.52	357 23.27 65.27 38.93	11 0.72 2.01 44.00	547 35.66
Reserve	9 0.59 0.91 64.29	53 3.46 5.37 66.25	351 22.88 35.56 70.48	560 36.51 56.74 61.07	14 0.91 1.42 56.00	987 64.34
Total	14 0.91	80 5.22	498 32.46	917 59.78	25 1.63	1534 100.00

	<u>DF</u>	<u>Value</u>	<u>Prob</u>
Chi-Square Statistic	4	13.35	.010

D. INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS

1. Demographic Data

Much of the demographic data (see Table 12) were unremarkable; however, there are a few areas which warrant comment. For instance, the frequencies of sex and race tend to reaffirm the fact that the Marine Corps junior officer

population is mostly male (93%) and white (92%). Marital status differences between Regular and Reserve officers were noticeable in that Reserve officers had a higher single percentage than Regular officers. The causes of these differences in marital status do not have an obvious explanation. The education level distribution was virtually identical for the two groups. Grade distribution, as expected, was different. The Reserve officer group was 43.5 percent First Lieutenants (O2) while the Regular officer group had only 21 percent of the officers in that grade. Obligated service length is the primary reason for this difference. Regular officers (Naval Academy and NROTC scholarship) have at least 4 years obligated service (5 years in the case of Naval Academy graduates). Most Reserve officer programs have a 3 1/2 year contractual commitment. Therefore, with promotion to Captain (O3) occurring at the 4 1/2 - 5 YCS flowpoint, first term Regular officers are usually Captains, while first term Reserve officers are usually just short of promotion to O3.

Military occupational specialties (MOS) provided some insight into which MOSs were losing officers by type of commission. Infantry led both tables as the MOS that lost the most junior officers. There are several possible explanations for this: (1) the large "pyramid effect" of this MOS, where officer requirements decrease with grade, causes a possible perceived lack of opportunity; (2) the

arduous nature of the infantry MOS (i.e. long deployments, both shipboard and to the field); and (3) since it is the most populated MOS in the Marine Corps, it would naturally have a proportionately larger share of the losses. Regular officers showed losses primarily in the "Ground" MOSs while Reserve officers had CH-46 and CH-53 Helicopter Pilot MOSs as the second and third ranked loss MOSs. A significant contributor to this loss of Reserve helicopter pilots was probably the extremely low augmentation percentage for the Helicopter category in the 85/1 ORB (see Table 8) of 9.1 percent. This low percentage not only forced some of these officers out of the Marine Corps (assuming an EAD was also denied) but more than likely also had a secondary negative impact upon the career expectation of other Reserve helicopter pilots. The loss of these highly trained Reserve helicopter pilots is costly in terms of lost training investment. The remaining MOS loss distribution is similar once the Reserve helicopter pilot issue is accounted for. The reasons for specific MOS attrition is beyond the scope of this thesis.

Source of entry was distributed as expected with most Regular officers coming from either the Naval Academy or NROTC Scholarship programs. Reserve officers were likewise distributed as expected.

Average GCT scores, a measure of relative intelligence, at first seemed to be significantly different between Regular and Reserve officers. Regular officers had a mean GCT 5.26 points higher than Reserve officers. However, upon statistical analysis using the T-Test, this difference was found not to be statistically significant and therefore we cannot infer a difference in mean GCT (or intelligence) between the Regular and Reserve officer. This result does not support Colonel Murphy's [Ref. 9] hypothesis that Naval Academy/NROTC officers are a source of more intelligent officers than other commissioning programs.

2. Survey Responses

The reasons ranked as most important (see Table 13) in affecting the decision to leave the Marine Corps between Regular and Reserve officers in this sample are significantly different. Regular officers cite many of the intrinsic aspects of the job as the primary reasons for leaving. For example, the top 2 reasons given by Regular officers for leaving the Marine Corps are "suppressed initiative, creativity and professional stimulation" and "poor utilization of skills, abilities and education." Conversely, Reserve officers ranked other factors as the top 2 reasons. The top two reasons most often cited by Reserve officers dealt with the lack of confidence in the fairness of both the fitness report system and in selection methods. By contrast, Regular officers rated these two reasons

numbers 5 and 6, respectively. It is not unreasonable to assume that those Reserve officers who failed augmentation would feel that both the fitness report system and selection methods were unfair. While this is not a startling revelation, it does document the hypothesis that the reasons given by Regular and Reserve officers for leaving are different.

3. Performance Analysis

The analysis of both the Straight Additive Performance Index (PI) and the Weighted Performance Index (PI WGTED) resulted in the inability to reject the null hypothesis that there was not a statistically significant difference in the performance between the Regular and Reserve officer samples. Table 14 illustrates the statistical analysis. Under the assumptions of equal or unequal variances, the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis using a T-Test was quite low. For the Straight Additive Performance Index it was less than 1 percent and for the Weighted Index it was less than 2 1/2 percent. The degrees of freedom were high because the tests utilized an average of every report on the sample officers, not an average of each officer's average score. Therefore, the T-Test of overall average performance by group was inconclusive. The null hypothesis could not be rejected in order to conclude there was a difference in average performance between the two groups.

The CHI-Square analysis was utilized to provide another test of group similarities/differences. A number of assumptions were made in order to group performance index scores into cells large enough to validate the CHI-Square test. The assumptions are presented in Table 14 section (B). The assumptions were based on how the total index corresponded to original markings. For example, a Performance Index of 0 to 1 was unsatisfactory. The Weighted Index was similarly grouped. The contingency table of status (Regular vs. Reserve) by performance (Unsatisfactory, Average, etc.) was tabulated and the CHI-Square test statistic computed. Both the Straight Performance Index (PI) and the Weighted Performance Index (PI WGTED) resulted in the inability to reject the null hypothesis that there was no statistically significant difference in the performance between Regular and Reserve officers.

Both tests regarding the performance of these two groups do not confirm or deny that either group outperforms the other, and as such are inconclusive. Possibly the narrative write-ups of Section C of the fitness reports would provide more performance evaluation; however, narrative comments are virtually impossible to quantify.

In summary, this chapter outlined the data and methodology, presented the results of the analysis, and the author's interpretation of the results. Many interesting

items were uncovered, but few conclusive statistical inferences were drawn. This analysis was presented as an example of the type of analysis that can be applied to the suggested research framework in Chapter IV.

The final chapter contains the conclusions and recommendations for the thesis.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A. CONCLUSIONS

1. From the Analysis

The following conclusions are based upon the analysis performed in Chapter V:

- There is no statistically significant difference in average GCT between the Regular and Reserve officers in this sample.
- Augmentation within a specific category has an effect on subsequent Reserve officer losses from MOSs in that category. This was illustrated by the apparent correlation of the 9.1 percent Helo category augmentation percentage and the high number of Reserve helicopter pilots who left the Marine Corps.
- Regular officers who resigned their commissions and Reserve officers who failed augmentation cite significantly different reasons as important in affecting their decision to leave the Marine Corps. The Reserve officers are much more concerned with the fairness of the fitness report system and selection methods. This is a result of their failure to augment. Regular officers, on the other hand, cite job intrinsic reasons such as "suppressed initiative" as their main reasons for leaving.
- There is no statistically significant difference in the performance between the Regular and Reserve officers in this sample.

2. General

The following conclusions are based on general augmentation research and the author's observations:

- There is a general lack of knowledge by junior Reserve officers regarding augmentation; what drives the quotas, legal background, etc. This lack of knowledge leads to subjective judgments and misdirected effort.

- Many factors which drive augmentation quota determination (such as Regular officer retention) are virtually uncontrollable by Marine Corps manpower planners and cannot be attempted to be constantly readjusted in order to make it easier for certain officers to augment in a given year. Stability in the overall officer corps should take precedence over selected junior officer career opportunity.
- DOPMA was designed to be an aid to the Reserve officer career and not a hindrance. DOPMA protects Reserve officers from the "career Reservist" syndrome which is a dangerous situation. The career Reservist may have had 18 YCS and be a victim of a reduction in force size. Both the Marine Corps and the Reserve officer have less to lose under DOPMA. Reserve officers should not blame DOPMA for augmentation difficulty.
- Current augmentation policy has been refined and seems to be quite fair.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The following actions are recommended as a result of this research:

- Educate junior Reserve officers on how the augmentation process really works and why it is designed as such. In addition, periodically update these officers in what they can do to help their chances to augment (for example, update and review their records). Education can be very helpful in squelching rumors and subjective assessments.
- Utilize the framework for analysis in Chapter IV before the next time the augmentation percentage drops. For example, development of the "attrition/retention early warning system" will enable the Marine Corps to foresee manpower planning crises. It is strongly recommended that HQMC sponsor much of this research contained in Chapter IV through the Marine Corps manpower students attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS has the resources and knowledge base to assist in this area of research. These resources, coupled with the Marine officer's knowledge of the Corps, will provide a much better product than a contractor-sponsored study.

- The Marine Corps should not make any significant changes in the method of quota computation for augmentation other than refining the computer interface between OPUS and MCORP. In addition, changes to the augmentation system should be based on research, such as outlined in Chapter IV, and not on the "wave of opinion."
- Enforce the completion of the Officer Exit Survey. A 30 percent response rate can be vastly improved through command attention. The information from the survey should be tabulated and reviewed. In addition, some composite performance files merged with the survey responses may provide valuable insight for manpower planners.

In summary, this thesis has attempted to provide a starting point for objective research on augmentation. Augmentation may or may not be a problem, but education and information can at least help determine if it is. Through research, the Marine Corps can look for every opportunity to improve augmentation or at least ensure that it is fair in selection, and in accomplishing the Corps' force structure goals. There is the painful reality that the Marine Corps will continue to need a large number of high quality Reserve company grade officers, and not all of them will have an opportunity for a career in the Regular Marine Corps. This may be difficult to explain to the hard-charging junior Reserve officer who wants to stay. The current situation places Marine Corps manpower planners at a disadvantage when critics of augmentation come to call. A research base would at least provide some justification for augmentation policy changes or for remaining unchanged.

I do not advocate mass changes to the augmentation system nor costly research efforts. The framework in Chapter IV provides some internal, minimum cost efforts to help guide policy. The tremendous investment the Marine Corps has in its officers more than justifies some research into augmentation policy. If needs change, policies should be reviewed and possibly changed. After all, it is the unique ability to innovate that has kept the Marine Corps alive for 211 years.

APPENDIX A MARINE CORPS BULLETIN 1040

SECTIONAL MESSAGE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECTIONAL MESSAGE

ARLINGTON ANNEX
MESSAGE CENTER

ROUTINE
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FM CMC WASHINGTON DC
TO ALMAH
ACCT 0A-CRRF

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5 YEARS.

UNCLAS //R01040// SECTION 01 OF 03
ALMAH 171/85

CNC//CODEDHP-30/

SUBJ: MCBUL 1040. FISCAL YEAR 86/1 OFFICER RETENTION (AUGMENTATION, EXTENSION, RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY)/REDESIGNATION BOARD

- A. MCO 1001.430
- B. MCO 1001.55
- C. MCO 1001.528
- D. MCO 1210.8A
- E. MCO P1200.70. MOS MANUAL
- F. MCO P1810.78
- G. MCO P1070.120
- H. MCO P1080.15E

1. THE FY 86/1 OFFICER RETENTION/REDESIGNATION BOARD (ORB) WILL CONVEY ON 5 NOV 1985 (AM REF A) THIS BULLETIN SOLICITS APPLICATIONS FROM RESERVE OFFICERS AND RESERVE WARRANT OFFICERS WHO DESIRE TO APPLY FOR RETENTION; I.E., AUGMENTATION, EXTENSION ON ACTIVE DUTY (EAD) OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY. ADDITIONALLY, THIS BULLETIN SOLICITS APPLICATIONS FROM LIMITED DUTY OFFICERS (LDO'S) FOR REDESIGNATION AS UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS.

2. TO PROPERLY CONTROL THE REGULAR OFFICER STRUCTURE, THE MARINE CORPS EMPLOYS A "YEAR GROUP" MANAGEMENT CONCEPT. (THE YEAR GROUP IS THE SET OF ALL OFFICERS APPOINTED IN A GRADE ABOVE CWO-4 IN A 12-MONTH PERIOD FROM 1 JULY TO 30 JUNE. FOR EXAMPLE, AN OFFICER COMMISSIONED 1 JULY 1985 IS IN YEAR GROUP 1985. WHILE AN OFFICER COMMISSIONED ON 1 JUNE 1985 IS IN YEAR GROUP 1985). UNDER THIS CONCEPT, QUOTAS ARE ESTABLISHED TO GOVERN THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGULAR OFFICERS IN EACH YEAR GROUP BY CATEGORY (GROUND (GRND), FIXED-WING (FW), PILOT, HELICOPTER (HELO), PILOT, NAVAL FLIGHT OFFICER (NFO), AND JUDGE ADVOCATE (JA)). THE REGULAR OFFICER POPULATIONS IN YEAR GROUPS 1976 THROUGH 1978 ARE ABOVE THE REQUIREMENT FOR REGULAR OFFICERS IN EACH CATEGORY IN THESE YEAR GROUPS. CATEGORY QUOTAS EXIST ONLY IN YEAR GROUPS 1979 THROUGH 1985.

3. ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS FOR RETENTION ARE OUTLINED IN REF A. INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE REDESIGNATION PROGRAM ARE OUTLINED IN PARAGRAPHS 14 THROUGH 16 OF THIS BULLETIN. OFFICERS WHO DESIRE AUGMENTATION ARE ENCOURAGED TO APPLY AS SOON AS THEY ARE ELIGIBLE (AM REF A AND THIS BULLETIN). THE FOLLOWING ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS PERTAIN TO UNRESTRICTED RESERVE OFFICERS AND RESERVE WARRANT OFFICERS WHO DESIRE AUGMENTATION/EAD OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY:

A. ONLY COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS WITH 12 MONTHS OBSERVED FITNESS REPORTS (SEE PARAGRAPH 13), ON ACTIVE DUTY OR IN THE READY RESERVE (SMCR OR IRR) AND IN A YEAR-GROUP CATEGORY THAT HAS AN OPENING (INDICATED WITH "OPEN" IN THE MATRIX BELOW) ARE ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR AUGMENTATION OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY

YG	GRND	FW	HELO	NFO	JA
85	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
84	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
83	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
82	CLOSED	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
81	CLOSED	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
80	CLOSED	CLOSED	OPEN	OPEN	OPEN
79	CLOSED	CLOSED	CLOSED	CLOSED	OPEN

B. ALTHOUGH THERE ARE LIMITED QUOTAS, RESERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS IN ALL YEAR GROUPS, WHO HAVE LESS THAN 9 YEARS COMMISSIONED SERVICE AS OF 5 NOV 1985, AND ARE ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST MAY ALSO APPLY FOR EAD. THESE OFFICERS MAY RECEIVE EXTENSIONS FROM 1 TO

C. OFFICERS WHO ARE ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR AUGMENTATION/EAD AND OFFICERS WHO ARE ONLY ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR EAD WILL SUBMIT THE SAME APPLICATION IN THE FORMAT IDENTIFIED IN ENCLOSURE (3) OF REF A. ALL OFFICERS WILL IDENTIFY THEIR YEAR GROUP AND CATEGORY IN THE INTRODUCTORY PARAGRAPH OF THEIR AA FORM.

D. OFFICERS ELIGIBLE FOR AUGMENTATION OR EAD ONLY, WHO DESIRE TO SUBMIT A SEPARATION PAY STATEMENT, WILL SUBMIT THE STATEMENT INDICATED IN PAR 3M(1) OF ENCLOSURE (3) OF REF A. APPLICATIONS WITH THE SEPARATION PAY STATEMENT MUST BE DATED BY 15 SEP 1985 TO MEET THE TIMING CRITERION FOR SEPARATION PAY IN PAR 3B OF ENCLOSURE (3) OF REF A.

E. RESERVE CAPTAINS SELECTED FOR MAJOR WHO ARE ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST WILL BE AUTOMATICALLY PROCESSED FOR AUGMENTATION WITHOUT ORB ACTION. (RESERVE CAPTAINS ON A PROMOTION LIST TO MAJOR WHO HAVE MORE THAN 9 YEARS COMMISSIONED SERVICE PRIOR TO 5 NOV 1985 AND WHO ARE ON ACTIVE DUTY, BUT NOT ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST, MAY APPLY FOR AUGMENTATION IF OTHERWISE ELIGIBLE UNDER THIS PARAGRAPH.) RESERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS IN THE SMCR OR IRR WITH MORE THAN 9 YEARS OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ON 5 NOV 1985 ARE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR THIS PROGRAM.

F. ALL RESERVE OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY MUST HAVE AN EAS DATE ON OR AFTER 1 MARCH 1986 TO APPLY FOR THE 86/1 ORB. NO WAIVERS TO THIS DATE WILL BE CONSIDERED. OFFICERS WHO CAN NOT COMPLY WITH THE 1 MARCH 1986 EAS DATE CAN REQUEST AN ADMINISTRATIVE EAD VIA MESSAGE OR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FORM (AM ENCLOSURE (4) OF REF A).

4. WARRANT OFFICERS MUST BE ON ACTIVE DUTY OR IN THE READY RESERVE. RESERVE WARRANT OFFICERS ON ACTIVE DUTY WITH THE REGULAR ESTABLISHMENT REQUESTING AUGMENTATION MAY BE OFFERED EAD'S FROM 1 TO 5 YEARS IN LIEU OF AUGMENTATION BY THE ORB TO GIVE THEM ADDITIONAL TIME TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR QUALIFICATIONS FOR AUGMENTATION. SIMILARLY, ELIGIBLE RESERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS AND RESERVE WARRANT OFFICERS IN THE READY RESERVE REQUESTING AUGMENTATION MAY BE OFFERED A STAND-ALONE WRITTEN AGREEMENT (SWAG), IN LIEU OF AUGMENTATION, TO PROVIDE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR QUALIFICATIONS FOR AUGMENTATION WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY. A SWAG WILL NORMALLY PROVIDE FOR 3 YEARS OF ACTIVE DUTY.

5. RESERVE FIELD GRADE OFFICERS WHO MEET ONE OF THE FOLLOWING CRITERIA MAY REQUEST AUGMENTATION AND WILL BE PROCESSED WITHOUT BOARD ACTION: (1) CAREER RESERVISTS OR EXTENDED DUTY RESERVISTS ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OF THE MARINE CORPS WHO HAVE NOT FAILED OF SELECTION FOR PROMOTION TO THE NEXT HIGHER FIELD GRADE; OR (2) RESERVE OFFICERS ON THE ACTIVE-DUTY LIST OF THE MARINE CORPS, UNDER SWAG OR EAD ORDERS, WHO WERE SELECTED FOR PROMOTION WHILE ON ACTIVE DUTY TO THE GRADE OF LIEUTENANT COLONEL OR COLONEL AFTER 14 SEPTEMBER 1981.

6. RESERVE FIELD GRADE OFFICERS WHO ARE SERVING ON ACTIVE DUTY TO PURSUE SPECIAL WORK (REF (B)), OR IN A FULL-TIME SUPPORT STATUS (REF (C)), AND HAVE NOT FAILED OF SELECTION TO THE NEXT HIGHER FIELD GRADE MAY REQUEST AUGMENTATION. SUCH REQUESTS WILL BE CONSIDERED BY THE ORB.

7. RETENTION I.E., AUGMENTATION, EAD, OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY UNDER SWAG, TOGETHER WITH LATERAL MOVES, IS USED TO HELP MEET THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE CORPS FOR OFFICERS IN PARTICULAR SKILLS. THE MARINE CORPS POLICY OF ASSIGNING MOS'S TO OFFICERS IS BASED, IN PART, ON THE DESIRE TO GIVE AS MANY OFFICERS AS POSSIBLE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SERVE IN THE COMBAT ARMS IN THE FLEET MARINE FORCE AFTER COMPLETION OF THE BASIC SCHOOL. THIS EXPERIENCE HAS BEEN INVALUABLE BOTH TO THE INDIVIDUAL OFFICER AND THE MARINE CORPS, IRRESPECTIVE OF THE SPECIALTY IN WHICH THE OFFICER MIGHT LATER SERVE. HOWEVER, THE

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 REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICERS IN THE COMBAT ARMS MOS'S GENERALLY DECREASES IN EACH SUCCEEDING GRADE; WHEREAS, THE REQUIREMENT FOR OFFICERS IN MOST OTHER MOS'S INCREASES IN EACH SUCCEEDING GRADE. A VOLUNTARY LATERAL MOVE PROGRAM (REF D) WAS ESTABLISHED TO HELP MEET THE REQUIREMENT FOR UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS IN THE MOS'S OUTSIDE THE COMBAT ARMS. WHILE SUCCESSFUL IN INCREASING THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS IN SOME MOS'S, THIS PROGRAM ALONE HAS NOT BEEN SUFFICIENT TO BRING ABOUT A DESIRABLE BALANCE OF OFFICERS IN ALL UNRESTRICTED OFFICER MOS'S. THEREFORE, RESERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS SELECTED FOR AUGMENTATION/ RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY WHO HOLD A PRIMARY MOS IN WHICH THE MARINE CORPS HAS AN OVERAGE OF OFFICERS MAY BE INVOLUNTARILY ASSIGNED A NEW PRIMARY MOS IN WHICH THE MARINE CORPS IS SHORT OF OFFICERS. 8. THE FOLLOWING IS A LIST OF PRIMARY MOS'S IN WHICH AN OVERAGE OF COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS EXISTS AND A LIST OF PRIMARY MOS'S IN WHICH A SHORTAGE OF THESE OFFICERS EXISTS:

OVER	SHORT
0302 INFANTRY	0180 ADMINISTRATION
0802 ARTILLERY	0402 LOGISTICS
1302 ENGINEER	2502 COMMUNICATION
1802 TANK	3002 GROUND SUPPLY
1803 ASSAULT AMPH VEH	

9. RESERVE COMPANY GRADE OFFICERS REQUESTING AUGMENTATION OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY WHO HOLD A PRIMARY MOS LISTED AS "OVER" IN PAR 8 ABOVE, SHALL SELECT TWO MOS'S LISTED AS "SHORT" IN THAT PARAGRAPH IN ORDER OF PREFERENCE. COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL COMMENT ON THE APPLICANT'S CHOICES AND/OR DESIRE TO RETAIN PRESENT PRIMARY MOS. REF E SHOULD BE USED AS A GUIDE TO ASSIST COMMANDERS IN THEIR REVIEW OF THE APPLICANT'S CHOICES. SUBSEQUENT TO SELECTION OF OFFICERS FOR RETENTION, THE ORB WILL REVIEW THE APPLICATIONS OF OFFICERS WHO ARE IN "OVER" MOS'S AND RECOMMEND THE ASSIGNMENT OF A NEW PRIMARY MOS OR RETENTION OF THE CURRENT MOS BASED UPON THE NEEDS OF THE MARINE CORPS, THE COMMANDING OFFICER'S ENDORSEMENT AND THE DESIRES OF THE APPLICANT.

10. APPLICATIONS FOR AUGMENTATION, EAD, OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY WILL BE MADE ON AN ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION FORM (NAVMC 10274) AND SUBMITTED TO THE COMMANDANT OF THE MARINE CORPS (CMC) (NMMA-3) VIA THE CHAIN OF COMMAND. APPLICATIONS WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH ENCLOSURE (3) OF REF A. ALL APPLICATIONS (INCLUDING MERITORIOUS) WILL INDICATE CURRENT COMMAND PHONE NUMBERS. ALL APPLICATIONS WILL BE SUBMITTED TO THE CMC (NMMA-3) BY 1 OCTOBER 1985. EXTENSIONS TO THIS DEADLINE WILL BE REQUESTED VIA MESSAGE AND WILL BE GRANTED ONLY IN EXTREME CASES. THE MESSAGE REQUESTING AN EXTENSION WILL INCLUDE THE NAME, SSN AND LATERAL MOVE CHOICES OF THE APPLICANT, IF APPLICABLE, AND THE REASON FOR THE DELAY. OFFICERS WHO DO NOT NOTIFY CMC (NMMA-3) EITHER VIA APPLICATION OR MESSAGE BY 1 OCTOBER 1985 WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD. ORIGINAL APPLICATIONS OF THOSE OFFICERS WHO WERE GRANTED EXTENSIONS OF THE 1 OCTOBER 1985 DEADLINE THAT DO NOT ARRIVE BY THE CONVENING DATE OF THE BOARD WILL NOT BE CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD.

11. ALL RESERVE OFFICERS APPLYING TO ORB 86/1 SHOULD REVIEW THEIR OFFICIAL RECORDS FOR COMPLETENESS AND ACCURACY. THE ORB USES TWO DOCUMENTS IN THE EVALUATION OF OFFICERS REQUESTING AUGMENTATION, EAD OR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY: THE MASTER BRIEF SHEET (MBS) AND THE OFFICIAL MILITARY PERSONNEL FILE (OMPF). THE MBS SUMMARIZES THE FITNESS REPORT MARKINGS IN THE OFFICER'S RECORD AT HEADQUARTERS, AND THE OMPF IS THE MICROFILM OF AN OFFICER'S PERSONNEL RECORD. FITNESS

REPORTS APPEARING ON THE MBS SHOULD ALSO APPEAR ON THE OMPF FOR THE EVALUATION DOCUMENTS TO BE COMPLETE. THE MBS MAY BE OBTAINED BY WRITING TO CMC (NMCE), HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001. THE OMPF MAY BE OBTAINED BY WRITING TO CMC (NMMA-10), HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS, WASHINGTON, DC 20380-0001. OFFICERS SHOULD ALSO ENSURE THAT GCT SCORES ARE IN MBS, AND DOCUMENTATION OF COLLEGE DEGREES ARE IN THE OMPF. THE ACCURACY OF OFFICIAL RECORDS IS A PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY (REF F REFERS).

12. OFFICERS MUST NOTIFY CMC (NMMA-10) OF ANY DISCREPANCIES AND INCLUDE, WHERE POSSIBLE, COPIES OF DOCUMENTS DETERMINED TO BE MISSING FROM THE OMPF. ONCE THE ORB SOLICITATION PERIOD ENDS (1 OCTOBER 85), A COPY OF ANY MISSING FITNESS REPORT OR ANY FITNESS REPORT THAT WILL NOT ARRIVE AT HEADQUARTERS IN TIME FOR THE BOARD SHOULD BE TELECOPIED TO HEADQUARTERS MARINE CORPS AT TEL: AREA CODE (202) 694-2803 OR AUTOVON 224-2803. ATTN: OFFICER RETENTION BOARD. ORIGINAL FITNESS REPORTS WILL NOT BE FORWARDED TO THE OFFICER RETENTION BOARD.

13. TO BE ELIGIBLE FOR ANY RETENTION PROGRAM, AN OFFICER MUST HAVE A MINIMUM OF 12 MONTHS OF OBSERVED FITNESS REPORTS, EXCLUDING ACADEMIC REPORTS, BY 1 OCTOBER 85. IT IS REQUESTED THAT COMMANDS VERIFY LENGTH OF OBSERVED FITNESS REPORTS ON ANY OFFICER IN QUESTION BY CONTACTING CMC (NMCE) BEFORE FORWARDING APPLICATIONS.

14. LIMITED DUTY OFFICERS WHO MEET THE FOLLOWING REQUIREMENTS ARE ELIGIBLE TO APPLY FOR REDESIGNATION AS REGULAR UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS

A. MUST BE QUALIFIED TO HOLD A CATEGORY I MOS THAT IS IN THE SAME OCCFLD AS THE APPLICANT'S PRIMARY MOS. THIS REQUIREMENT MAY BE WAIVED FOR LDO'S WHOSE OCCFLD DOES NOT CONTAIN A CATEGORY I MOS PROVIDED THEY CAN DEMONSTRATE QUALIFICATIONS TO HOLD A CATEGORY I MOS AS A PRIMARY MOS.

B. HAVE A BACCALAUREATE DEGREE FROM A REGIONALLY ACCREDITED COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY. THIS REQUIREMENT MAY BE WAIVED ONLY IN EXCEPTIONAL CASES. THE APPLICANT'S COMMANDING OFFICER MUST RECOMMEND SUCH A WAIVER AND ILLUSTRATE THE PROGRESS MADE BY THE APPLICANT TOWARD COMPLETION OF THE DEGREE. THE APPLICANT SHALL INCLUDE IN THE APPLICATION AN OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF ALL COLLEGE WORK.

C. MUST HAVE COMPLETED AT LEAST 2 YEARS OF SERVICE AS AN LDO.

D. MUST NOT BE ON A PROMOTION LIST.

E. MUST BE ABLE TO COMPLETE 10 YEARS OF ACTIVE COMMISSIONED SERVICE BEFORE ATTAINMENT OF AGE 55.

F. MUST BE RECOMMENDED FOR REDESIGNATION BY THE COMMANDING OFFICER/COMMANDING GENERAL.

G. MUST NOT BE SUBJECT TO MANDATORY RETIREMENT FOR YEARS OF SERVICE AS AN LDO BEFORE 1 JULY 1986.

15. AN OFFICER DESIGNATED FOR LIMITED DUTY MAY NOT BE CONSIDERED FOR REDESIGNATION AS AN UNRESTRICTED OFFICER MORE THAN TWICE IN THE COMMISSIONED GRADE IN WHICH SERVING.

16. APPLICATIONS FOR REDESIGNATION FROM LDO TO UNRESTRICTED OFFICER MUST INCLUDE:

- CURRENT PRIMARY AND ADDITIONAL MOS'S.
- CATEGORY I MOS FOR WHICH APPLYING.
- DATE OF BIRTH.
- DATE APPOINTED WARRANT OFFICER, W-1 (IF APPLICABLE).
- DATE APPOINTED LDO.
- PROOF OF A BACCALAUREATE DEGREE OR COLLEGE WORK COMPLETED.
- CURRENT PHOTOGRAPH IN ACCORDANCE WITH REF (G).
- COMMAND PHONE NUMBERS.

THE APPLICATION MUST INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT: "I UNDERSTAND THAT IF SELECTED FOR REDESIGNATION AS A REGULAR UNRESTRICTED OFFICER I WILL BE SUBJECT TO THE LAWS GOVERNING PROMOTION, TENURE AND RETIREMENT."

ROUTINE
R 121800Z AUG 85
FM CMC WASHINGTON DC
TO ALMAR
ACCT BA-CNR

ZYUW RUEADHC9955 2241319

D. 5 NOVEMBER 1985 - BOARD CONVENES - ALL LATE APPLICATIONS
DUE. NO EXCEPTIONS
E. 2 JANUARY 1986 - BOARD RESULTS RELEASED.
23. THIS BULLETIN IS APPLICABLE TO THE MCR.
24. THIS BULLETIN IS CANCELED 31 JANUARY 1986. BT

UNCLAS //NO1040// FINAL SECTION OF 03
MENT FOR REGULAR UNRESTRICTED OFFICERS." REDESIGNATION APPLICATIONS
MUST BE SUBMITTED BY 1 OCTOBER 1985.

17. COMPREHENSIVE RECOMMENDATIONS BY COMMANDERS IN THE ENDORSING
CHAIN OF COMMAND ARE AN ESSENTIAL PART OF EACH APPLICATION SUBMITTED
FOR RETENTION OR REDESIGNATION. THEY ARE OF GREAT VALUE TO THE OMB
IN EVALUATING AN OFFICER'S PERFORMANCE AND POTENTIAL FOR ACTIVE
SERVICE. RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON PERSONAL INTERVIEWS/SCREENING
BOARDS ARE ALSO AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF THE SELECTION PROCESS.
ENDORSEMENTS AT REGIMENTAL/GROUP LEVEL WILL INCLUDE THE APPLICANT'S
RELATIVE STANDING AMONG ALL APPLICANTS. THE FOLLOWING WILL BE
INCLUDED IN THE RECOMMENDATION:

- A. RECOMMENDED WITH ENTHUSIASM: OR
- B. RECOMMENDED WITH CONFIDENCE: OR
- C. RECOMMENDED WITH RESERVATION: OR
- D. NOT RECOMMENDED

18. THE COMMANDING OFFICER WILL DIRECT THAT A REVIEW OF THE OFFI-
CER'S HEALTH RECORD BE MADE BY A LOCAL MEDICAL AUTHORITY. THE COM-
MANDING OFFICER WILL INDICATE IN THE FORWARDING ENDORSEMENT WHETHER
THE OFFICER IS MEDICALLY QUALIFIED BASED ON THIS REVIEW. NO PHYSICAL
EXAMINATION IS NECESSARY UNLESS THE OFFICER IS SERVING IN A MEDICALLY
RESTRICTED STATUS, OR IS IN ANY OTHER WAY CONSIDERED PHYSICALLY UNFIT
FOR DUTY. IN THAT CASE, A MEDICAL EXAMINATION IS REQUIRED AND THE
APPLICATION WITH COMPLETED REPORT OF MEDICAL EXAMINATION AND REPORT
OF MEDICAL HISTORY (SP'S 88 AND 93) WILL BE FORWARDED TO CMC (MCA)
VIA THE COMMANDER, NAVAL MEDICAL COMMAND

19. REF H REQUIRES THAT SUBMISSION OF AN APPLICATION FOR AUGMENTA-
TION MUST BE REPORTED BY UNIT DIARY ENTRY. COMMANDS WILL FOLLOW THE
INSTRUCTIONS OUTLINED IN PAR 8048.8 OF REF H

20. THE NAMES OF OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR AUGMENTATION/REDESIGNATION
MUST BE APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AND NOMINATED BY THE
PRESIDENT TO THE SENATE FOR CONFIRMATION. THE NAMES OF OFFICERS
RECOMMENDED FOR EAD OR SWAG MUST BE APPROVED BY THE COMMANDANT OF
THE MARINE CORPS. THE NAMES OF ALL OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR RETEN-
TION (AUGMENTATION, SWAG, OR EAD) OR REDESIGNATION WILL BE RELEASED
BY ALMAR AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY APPROVES
THE LIST OF OFFICERS RECOMMENDED FOR AUGMENTATION/REDESIGNATION.
SECRETARY OF THE NAVY APPROVAL IS NOT ANTICIPATED UNTIL 2 JANUARY
1986

21. COMMANDING OFFICERS WILL ENSURE THAT THIS BULLETIN IS BROUGHT
TO THE ATTENTION OF ALL OFFICERS ELIGIBLE FOR CONSIDERATION UNDER
ITS PROVISIONS. IN ADDITION, THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 4TH MARINE
DIVISION; THE COMMANDING GENERAL, 4TH MARINE AIRCRAFT WING, AND THE
DIRECTOR, MARINE CORPS RESERVE SUPPORT CENTER WILL ENSURE THAT
ELIGIBLE OFFICERS IN THE READY RESERVE ARE INFORMED OF THEIR
OPPORTUNITY TO APPLY FOR RETURN TO ACTIVE DUTY. COMMANDING OFFICERS
SHOULD NOT DISCOURAGE ELIGIBLE OFFICERS FROM APPLYING FOR RETENTION
ON ACTIVE DUTY, BUT SHOULD RECORD THEIR CONCERNS, IF ANY, ABOUT AN
OFFICER'S QUALIFICATIONS IN THEIR ENDORSEMENTS.

22. THE FOLLOWING IS A SUMMARY OF DUE DATES/MILESTONES:

- A. 15 SEPTEMBER 1985 - ALL REQUESTS FOR ADMIN EAD TO ENSURE
MINIMUM EAS ELIGIBILITY OF 1 MARCH 1986 FOR OMB 86/1 DUE
- B. 15 SEPTEMBER 1985 - ALL AA FORMS MUST BE OTO NO LATER THAN
THIS DATE TO MEET THE TIMING CRITERION FOR SEPARATION PAY.
- C. 1 OCTOBER 1985 - ALL RETENTION/REDESIGNATION REQUESTS DUE.
NO EXCEPTIONS UNLESS WAIVER MESSAGE RECEIVED BY CMC (MCA-3) PRIOR TO
1 OCTOBER 1985

* U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1955-545-300

ALIGNMENT LINE

REF MCD 71618 7

← STAPLE ADDITIONAL PAGES HERE

7.

A If you are VOLUNTARILY SEPARATING How important has each of the following been in your decision to separate?
If you are INVOLUNTARILY SEPARATING or RETIRING How important has each of the following been in its influence on you?

Extremely Important
Very Important
Important
Of Some Importance
Not True or of No Importance

B After completing A, indicate here the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd most important reasons.

Mark Only One in Each Column
Of the 34 possible reasons

1 ... What is the most important reason?
2 ... What is the second most important reason?
3 ... What is the third most important reason?

- | | | | | | | | | | |
|----|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| 1 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Insufficient pay and/or allowances | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 2 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Pay and allowances for higher ranks are too low..... | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 3 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Poor quality/availability of living Quarters | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 4 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Poor BOQ facilities | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 5 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of adequate dependent medical care | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 6 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Poor quality of commissary/exchange | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 7 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of opportunity to specialize | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 8 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Long hours and work pressures | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 9 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Poor utilization of abilities, skills, education | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 10 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Insufficient personnel/equipment support | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 11 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Too much paperwork (administrative tasks, inspections, procedures)..... | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 12 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Can't get the education or technical training I want | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 13 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Suppressed initiative, creativity, professional stimulation | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 14 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Too much crises management | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 15 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Believe my performance record is not competitive enough for promotion..... | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 16 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Dislike of military life style/restricting rules and regulations | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 17 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of freedom to use non-working hours as I want | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 18 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | A non-caring monitor (assignment desk) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 19 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Unable to sufficiently plan and control career | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 20 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of command opportunity | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 21 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Limited duty assignments (type) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 22 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Can't get the assignment location I want | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 23 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Geographic instability/frequency of PCS moves | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 24 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of confidence in fairness of fitness report system | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 25 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of opportunity for accelerated promotion | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 26 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of confidence in selection methods | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 27 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Unable to obtain desired MOS | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 28 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Possible erosion of benefits (retirement, commissary, medical, etc.) | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 29 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Too much family separation | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 30 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | My spouse does not want me to stay in the Marine Corps | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 31 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of respect by juniors/seniors | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 32 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Lack of adequate dependent dental care | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 33 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Too much sexual harassment | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |
| 34 | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | Too much sexual discrimination | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> | <input type="radio"/> |

Please check to be sure you have answered every item on the front and back of this form. If the items (above) do not adequately reflect your reasons for separating, please state your reason within the box provided on the right →

DO NOT WRITE OUTSIDE THIS BOX

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